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Summary  findings
The trading  of rights to emit carbon dioxide has not  The authors also consider what might happen if
officially been sanctioned by the United Nations  developing countries were to voluntarily accept caps
Framework Convention on Climate Change, but it is of  equal to Business  as Usual Emissions and were allowed to
interest to investigate the consequences, both for  sell emission reductions below these caps to Annex B
industrial (Annex B) and developing countries, of  countries. The gains from emissions trading could be big
allowing such trades. Ellerman, Jacoby, and Decaux  enough to give buyers and sellers incentive to support
examine the trading of caps assigned to Annex B  the system. Indeed, a global market for rights to emit
countries under the Kyoto Protocol and compare the  carbon dioxide could reduce the cost of meeting the
outcome with a world in which Annex B countries meet  Kyoto targets by almost 90 percent, if the market were to
their  Kyoto targets without trading. Under the trading  operate competitively. The division of trading gains,
scenario the former Soviet Union is the main seller of  however, may make a competitive outcome unlikely:
carbon dioxide permits and Japan, the European Union,  Under perfect competition, the vast majority of trading
and the United States are the main buyers. Permit trading  gains go to buyers of permits rather than to sellers. Even
is estimated to reduce the aggregate cost of meeting the  markets in which the supply of permits is restricted can,
Kyoto targets by about 50 percent, compared with no  however, substantially reduce the cost to Annex B
trading. Developing countries, though they do not trade,  countries of meeting their Kyoto targets, while yielding
are nonetheless affected by trading. For example, the  profits to developing countries that elect to sell permits.
price of oil and the demand for other developing country
exports are higher with trading than without.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Kyoto Protocol  recognizes  a strong linkage  between  C02 emission  reduction  goals,  emissions
trading, and the role of developing economies. Annex B  parties, generally the industrialized
nations,  have set targets that, for most, imply a significant  reduction  of C02-equivalent  emissions
by 2010. The ability and even willingness  of Annex B parties  to achieve  these targets will depend
on the cost of abatement.  The cheapest  sources of CO 2 emission  reductions  are found,  not in the
Annex B countries,  but in the developing  economies  (or non-Annex  B parties),  which for historic
and equity reasons  are not expected  to contribute  to the global emissions  reduction  in the near
term. Since  the location  of C02 emissions  does not matter  from a global warming  perspective,  the
achievement  of the Kyoto  targets will depend in large part upon the ability of Annex B countries  to
substitute  cheaper  emission  reductions  in non-Annex  B regions  for equivalent  abatement  at home.
In providing a mechanism  for  this exchange, emissions  trading not only reduces the cost of
meeting  the Kyoto  goals  for Annex B parties,  but also provides  a new source  of export  earnings  for
non-Annex  B parties.
Developing country interest in emissions  trading is not limited to the potential for new export
earnings.  Achieving the goals set at Kyoto will change patterns  of consumption  and production
within Annex  B  nations; and  these changes will  have inevitable effects on  the  flows  of
internationally  traded goods.  As a result,  developing  countries  will be affected  through  conventional
trade linkages  with the Annex B countries;  however,  these  effects,  both favorable  and unfavorable,
will be diminished  to the extent that emissions  trading reduces  the cost of achieving  the Kyoto
targets.
In examining  the effects of the Kyoto Protocol upon non-Annex  B parties, we assume that the
Annex B goals are met, and we focus in particular  on how emissions trading would affect the
developing countries. We  refer to  emissions trading generically, to  include bubbles, joint
implementation,  allowance  or credit  systems,  and perhaps  other  forms yet to be devised.  The chief
practical distinction among these forms concerns the transaction cost involved in effecting an
individual  trade.
The paper relies heavily upon the use of marginal abatement curves (MACs). These curves
represent  the marginal  cost of reducing  carbon  emissions  by different  amounts  within an economy.
The details of their construction,  and the elaboration  of the aggregate  demand  and supply curves
for carbon  permits  which  are drawn  from them, are explained  in Appendix  A. The MACs  used here
are generated  using MIT's Emissions  Prediction  and Policy Assessment  (EPPA) model (Yang et
al. 1996).  This is a multi-sectoral,  multi-regional,  computable  general equilibrium  (CGE) model of
global economic  activity, energy use and carbon emissions.  The underlying  model simulates  real
emission reductions, so that our analysis implicitly assumes that  the "additionality" criterion
established  in the Kyoto Protocol [Arts. 6.1(b) and 12.5(c)] is satisfied. We do not attempt to
address  the considerable  political  and practical  problems  of measurement  and verification  that are
associated  with this criterion,  but we will account  for the effect of these problems  in a subsequent
section.2
The main body of the paper consists  of five sections.  Section  2 uses the MACs  to analyze  three
basic cases: no emissions  trading, emissions  trading limited to Annex B parties (including  the
Former  Soviet Union),  and full global trading. Results  are presented  in graphical  form in the text,
2  UNCTAD (1998) contains an excellent discussion of these issues.3
and the regional detail--in  terms of abatement,  costs, emission  permit  trade and prices  for all the
cases  discussed--is  presented  in tabular  form in Appendix  B.
The next three sections  address  the effects  of various  departures  from the three basic cases.  The
first departure,  in Section 3, is the effect of limitations  on imports  of emission permits,  as might
correspond  to the "supplementarity"  criterion  included  in the Kyoto  Protocol  [Arts. 6.1(d)  and 17] or
to the recent  call by the EU environmental  ministers  for a "concrete  ceiling"  on emissions  trading.
Section 4 evaluates  the effect of surcharges  on emission permits generated under the Clean
Development  Mechanism  (CDM), as also provided in the Kyoto Protocol  [Art. 12.8], and of non-
competitive  pricing.  The third departure,  discussed  in Section  5, is the effect of a smaller  supply  of
permits from the non-Annex B  regions than is indicated by EPPA's assumptions  of complete
economic  rationality  and zero  transaction  costs,  which  we term "inefficient  supply."
In Sections  2 through  5, the measure  of welfare used is the total direct resource  cost required  to
meet the emissions  constraint.  As explained  in Appendix  A, for any country  this cost is the area
under its marginal  abatement  curve up to any point of constraint,  corrected  for any purchase  or
sale of emissions  permits.  This is the conventional  measure  which is generated using the MAC
approach.  However,  because  the MACs are generated  at the country level, they are not able to
take account  of effects  that are mediated  through international  trade in energy or other goods. As
shown  in Appendix  A, the MAC  results  themselves  are not sensitive  to trade  effects. Nevertheless,
these effects will influence  sub-national  details, such as patterns  of trade in particular  goods and
activity  at the sectoral  level. To explore  these effects,  we depart  from the MAC analysis  in Section
6, and present  results  taken  directly  from the EPPA  model.
In Section  7 we offer some  concluding  observations.
In conducting  our analysis,  we will make frequent reference  to the twelve regions represented  in
EPPA,  which are listed below  with  the model's  acronyms.
ANNEX B REGIONS:  NON-ANNEx B REGIONS:
USA:  USA  EEX:  Energy  Exporting  Countries
JPN:  Japan  CHN:  China
EEC:  European  Union  (12 countries)  IND:  India
OOE:  Other  OECD  Countries  DAE:  Dynamic  Asian Economies
EET:  Eastern  Economies  in Transition  BRA:  Brazil
FSU:  Former  Soviet  Union  ROW: Rest Of World
Definition of Regions in the EPPA Model
The C02  emission reductions  required of Annex B  regions are calculated as the differences
between  EPPA's  predicted  emissions  for these regions  in 2010  and the goals established  at Kyoto4
for the constituent  parties, which are generally stated as a percentage  of  1990 emissions,  as
indicated  in Table 1 below. 3 4
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  FSU  Non An.  B
Ref  emissions  1990  (Mton)  1362  298  822  318  266  891  2022
Ref emissions 2010  (Mton)  1838  424  1064  472  395  763  4142
Kvoto  commitments  I 1990  93%  94%  92%  94.5%  104%  98%  NA>.
Hence  Emissions Tar-et in  1267  280  756  301  273  873  4142
2010  (Mton)
i.e. Reduction I ref  Mton  571  144  308  171  118  0  NA
%  31%  34%  29%  36%  30%  0  NA
"Hot  Air" (Mton)  0  0  0  0  0  111  NA
Table 1: Emissions Levels Corresponding to Kyoto Commitments
Only five of the six EPPA regions encompassing  Annex B  countries are constrained by the
commitment  made at Kyoto 5 and these five will subsequently  be termed the Kyoto-constrained
regions.  For  the sixth  Annex B region,  the FSU,  emissions  are predicted  to be below  the aggregate
level to  which the  principal nations constituting the  FSU-Russia,  the  Ukraine, and  the
Baltics-committed  at  Kyoto. The difference between the  FSU commitment and  predicted
emissions  is controversially  called "hot air," but in our analysis we assume that it constitutes  a
"right to emit" that can be exported. For the non-Annex  B regions, as well as for the FSU, any
reduction from  2010 reference emissions also generates a  permit for  export to  the  Kyoto-
constrained  regions.
3 Under  Kyoto Protocol  accounting,  as best it is understood,  this procedure  involves  the implicit assumption  that all
other GHGs are also reduced by the same percentage  below the appropriate  baseline value for each. No costs are
included  for these  controls  in our study,  nor  is any account  taken  of possible  carbon  sinks.
4 The correspondence  between  regional  aggregates  in EPPA and Annex B parties is not exact.  For instance,  Turkey  is
included  in OOE  (Other  OECD), but it is not an Annex B party. Similarly  EET includes  all of the former Yugoslavia,
but only Slovenia  and Croatia are Annex  B parties.  Likewise,  the Central Asian Republics  are included  in the FSU, but
they  also are not Annex  B parties. Furthermore,  the Kyoto  commitments  indicated  for these  EPPA  regions  depend  upon
our weighting  of various  constituent  Annex  B countries.  Finally,  the Annex B countries  constituting  the EET committed
to targets at Kyoto that were from 5% to 8% below baseline emissions;  however,  these  countries were allowed to
choose  an alternative  to 1990  as the baseline  year.  Based  on the national  communications  to date, the  change  of baseline
year appears  to translate  into a limitation  that  is 4% above 1990 emissions  for this region as a whole.  The term 'hot air'
refers to the amount  by which any country's emissions are expected to be below the Kyoto  Commitment,  which is
widely  expected  to be the case for the FSU.
5 The Kyoto  Protocol  refers to the targets  established  for Annex B parties as "legally binding  commitments,"  although
neither the legal structure nor the sanctioning  mechanism  are evident.  In this paper, we use the terms "goals,"
"targets,"  and "commitments"  more  or less interchangeably.5
2. THREE  BASIC  CASES:  NO  TRADING,  ANNEX  B TRADING  AND FULL
GLOBAL  TRADING
Three basic  cases  are used to illustrate  the effects  of the Kyoto Protocol  and the role of emissions
trading. The first case is an autarkic  one in which Annex B parties meet their Kyoto  commitments
without any emissions  trading. As a result, the FSU and non-Annex  B regions are affected only
through the prices and quantities of goods traded with the Kyoto-constrained  regions. In the
second case, Annex B parties (including the FSU) trade emission permits among themselves.
Emissions  trading  within Annex B reduces  the costs of the Kyoto commitment  for the constrained
regions, and the FSU finds a new source of export revenue; but non-Annex B countries will
continue  to be affected only through conventional  trade linkages.  The third basic case examines
emissions  trading  on a global scale in which non-Annex  B countries  join the FSU in earning  export
revenue  from supplying  permits  to Annex B countries. Further  variations  of these basic cases will
be developed  in subsequent  sections,  but these  three  frame the salient  alternatives.
a) The Autarkic,  No-Trading Case (Fig. 1, Table A
Fig.  1 presents  the MACs and the costs associated  with the carbon  emission  reductions  required
of each of the Kyoto-constrained  regions  (excluding  the FSU)  when there is no emissions  trading. 6
The black diamonds on the MACs indicate, on the horizontal axis, the quantity of abatement
required  of each region  (cf. Table 1), and, on the vertical axis, the shadow  price of carbon  for the
region.  The shadow  price is the marginal  cost for the last ton abated.  The autarkic marginal  cost of
abatement  for Japan ($584/ton) is much higher  than the marginal  costs for the EEC ($273), the
OOE ($233),  the USA ($186), or the EET  ($116). The areas under the curves represent  the total
costs  of abatement  for each region,  which  sum to $120 billion. 7 The details  are shown  in Appendix
B, Table A.
With no emissions  trading,  there are no export  earnings  for the FSU or the non-Annex  B regions.
None of these regions  would have any incentive  to abate in order to generate  "rights  to emit" for
export;  and,  of course,  the FSU would  not be able to export  its "hot air."
b) Annex  B Tradina  (Figs.  2 and  3, Table  B)
Fig 2 shows  the effect  of Annex B trading  on the Kyoto-constrained  regions.  At the market  clearing
price of $127/ton, the OECD regions (USA, EEC, JPN, OOE) are importers  of permits and the
EET  and FSU are exporters.  As an unconstrained  Annex B party, the FSU  accounts  for virtually  all
of the exports  (98%).  As shown in Fig. 3, about a third of these consist  of "hot air," with a cost of
zero; but the remaining  exports  are generated  by abatement  undertaken  to earn additional  export
profits up to the point where marginal  abatement  cost equals the market price. It costs the FSU
$10 billion  to abate 234 megatons  (Mton), but the permits  can be sold for $30 billion for a net
gain of $20 billion. When added  to the $14 billion earned  for exporting  111 Mton of the unused
Kyoto  entitlement,  the FSU's  total gain  from emissions  trading  is $34 billion.
6  The MACs for the OOE  and EET are virtually  identical  and are therefore  superimposed  in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 3:  Trade  with FSU:  the  'hot  air'  effect
For  the  five  Kyoto-constrained  regions  depicted  on  Fig  2,  the  cost  of  meeting  the  Kyoto
commitment is reduced by $32 billion. This is the area of the hatched triangles, which represent
costly domestic abatement avoided by importing permits for the four OECD regions and the export
earnings for the EET. From the standpoint of world resource use, the aggregate cost of meeting
the Kyoto commitments is much lower with Annex B trade ($54 billion) than without ($120 billion).
The total gains from emissions trading are $66 billion,  split about evenly between the FSU ($34
billion) and the OECD + EET ($32 billion).
The distribution of the reduction in costs  (that is, the gains from emissions trading for the Kyoto-
constrained regions) is distributed roughly in proportion to autarkic marginal cost. The two regions
with the highest autarkic marginal costs, Japan and the EEC, benefit the most from traded permits.
Japan  imports 66% of its reduction requirement  and reduces  its cost by $19  billion. The  EEC
imports 350Y  of its reduction requirement and reduces its cost by $7 billion. These two regions
account  for  about  one-third  of  the  total  emission  reduction  requirement  for  the  five  Kyoto-
constrained regions, and about five-sixths of the gains from emissions trading for these regions
accrue to them. The other three regions are characterized by autarkic marginal costs much closer
to  the  Annex  B  market  price;  consequently,  they  trade  much  less.  The  USA  and  OOE  are
importers for 19% and 25% of their respective requirements, and the EET reduces emissions by
5% more than required in order to export permits. The gains for these regions, which account for
two-thirds of the total reduction requirement, total $5 billion, about a sixth of the gains from trading
for the Kyoto-constrained regions.
This distribution of the gains from trade reflects an important feature of emissions trading. Regions
with  autarkic marginal cost farther  from the trading  equilibrium will  import  or export  more (and
benefit more) than those regions with autarkic marginal cost closer to the trading equilibrium. Thus,
Japan and the EEC benefit most from emissions trading among the importers, as does the FSU,
not just because of the "hot air," but also because its autarkic marginal cost ($0/ton)  is far from the
market price.
c) Full Global  Tradina  (Fig.  4, Table  C)
To illustrate full global trading,  we  rely on aggregate  supply and  demand curves for emissions
permits (not abatement), as  explained in the Appendix A and illustrated in  Fia. 4. These curves
indicate the total quantities of permits that would be supplied or demanded at various price levels
in a given  market. In Figure 4, there is only one demand curve because the  Kyoto-constrained7
regions are the same in both the Annex B and the global markets. Only the supply changes,
reflecting  the large amount of low-cost  carbon abatement  that becomes  potentially  available  with
the shift to global trading. The ample supply of permits  from non-Annex B regions results in a
market price that is much lower ($24tton) than in the Annex B trading case. The total cost of
reducing  global C02  emissions  to achieve  the Kyoto  goals is reduced  dramatically:  $11 billion  vs.
$54 billion  or $120 billion  in the other  two cases!
At this price, the Kyoto-constrained  regions  depend far more on imports  than when trading was
restricted  to Annex B regions  only. In the aggregate,  71% of OECD  + EET commitments  are met
by importing  emission  permits from non-constrained  regions;  and the percentage  reliance upon
imports  reflects  autarkic marginal  cost: Japan, 92%; EEC, 76%; USA, 68%; OOE, 66% and EET,
56%.  On the suppliers'  side,  three countries  account  for the bulk of exports:  China  (47%),  the FSU
(23%) and India (11%), hence 81% altogether.  Whether  because  of relatively  small size or high
relative  abatement  costs,  the remaining  four non-Annex  B regions  are small suppliers  of emission
permits  to the Annex  B regions.
With full  global trading, the gains from  emissions trading are much greater for  the  Kyoto-
constrained  regions  ($94 billion  vs. $32 billion  with Annex B trading). The non-An  iex B regions
gain $10 billion  by exporting  permits, but their gains are markedly  less than those .A  the Kyoto-
constrained  regions. The FSU is the only party that is made worse off by this widening of the
market.  At $24/ton,  the FSU abates about half as much  as before,  (101 Mton),  and the "hot air" is
worth  much less.  As a result,  the FSU's net gain ($4 billion)  in the global  market  is much  less than
its $34 billion  gain when  it does not compete  with the non-Annex  B regions.
The distribution of the gains from emissions  trading in the global market illustrates again the
feature  of emissions  trading  we just noted:  regions  whose autarkic  marginal  cost is further  from the
equilibrium  price benefit more than regions whose marginal cost is closer to that price. In this
global trading case, the clearing price is much closer to the suppliers' autarkic marginal cost
($01ton)  than it is to the autarkic  marginal  cost of any of the importers.
di)  Effect  of Higher  and Lower  Economic  Growth  (Figs.  5 and 6, Tables  A' to C, A" to C'"
The three basic cases, and those to be presented  hereafter,  provide point estimates  of prices,
quantities and costs. In this section, we briefly note the effect of different assumptions  about
economic growth, namely, that it  is 10% higher and 10% lower than in the reference EPPA
projection  for all regions. Fig. 5 shows the effect of higher and lower growth rates for illustrative
Kyoto-constrained  regions  (JPN,  EEC and USA),  and Fiq. 6 shows  the effects  on aggregate  supply
and demand  for permits  in the Annex  B and full global markets.
The effects  of higher  or lower growth on emissions  is typically  fairly small,  always less than ± 5%,
but the Kyoto commitment  is fixed so that the effect on the required reduction  is amplified. For
instance,  for the Kyoto-constrained  regions,  the variation  in total required emission  is ± 13-14%.
Finally, the change  in total costs, without trading, is even greater (± 31-36%),  because  the most
expensive  abatement,  that on the margin, represented  by the hatched area in Fig. 5, is what is
being increased  or decreased  by the variation  in economic  growth.
When aggregated  into demand  and supply curves for permits,  the variation in economic  growth
has a large effect on demand, but not much on supply since most of the supply comes from
unconstrained  regions,  the FSU or the non-Annex  B countries.  The chief effect  upon supply  within8
the relevant  price range is through the influence  on hot air. Higher growih reduces hot air and
shifts the supply  curve inward;  and conversely,  for lower  economic  growth.
The effect of higher  or lower economic  growth on the price and quantities  of traded permits  is very
different  in the Annex B and full global trading  markets. In the former, the volumes  traded change
very slightly (± 12 Mton), but the price varies greatly (± $40). In a market limited to Annex B
regions,  most of the incremental  effort required  by higher  or lower growth translates into more or
less domestic abatement.  In contrast,  for full global trading, the aggregate  supply curve is flatter,
so that the variation in the volume of traded permits is greater (± 120 Mton) but the variation  in
price much less  (± $6).
The variation in total cost for the Kyoto-constrained  regions  is slightly greater in the trading cases
than in the non-trading  case (+ 36-42%  vs. ± 31-36%)  because  with lower  or higher  growth,  greater
or smaller  amounts  of hot air from the FSU  enter  the trading system.
e) Per Capita  Emissions  (Fiq. 7)
As a further summary  statistic,  the effect  of the Kyoto  commitment  and of the scope of trading can
be shown  in per capita  terms.  Table 2 below  provides  full regional  detail, but the essential  features
can be grasped  by reference  to Fia 7, where per capita emissions  in 2010 are shown  for the USA,
the five Kyoto-constrained  regions  as a group,  the FSU,  the Non-Annex  B regions,  and the world.
TABLE  2a. PER CAPITA  EMISSIONS  IN  THE REFERENCE  CASE  AND  IN THE
THREE BASIC  TRADING  CASES
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  OtCD  FSU  Non-  World
+ EET  An. B
Pop.  in 2010  (million)  277.2  125.0  341.9  135.8  128.5  1008.3  324.5  5585.7  6918.5
Reference  (tonClcap)  6.63  3.39  3.11  3.48  3.07  4.16  2.35  0.74  1.32
No  Trading  (tonC/cap)  4.57  2.24  2.21  2.21  2.15  2.86  2.35  0.74  1.13
Annex  B  Trading  (tonC/cap)  4.95  3.00  2.52  2.53  2.11  3.20  1.63  0.74  1.14
World  Trading  (tonClcap)  5.98  3.30  2.90  3.04  2.67  2.78  2.04  0.61  1.14
TABLE  2b. DETAILS  FOR NON-ANNEX  B REGIONS
EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Pop.  in 2010  (million)  1103.8  1376.9  1132.4  236.8  199.9  1535.8
Reference  (tonC/cap)  0.84  1.30  0.43  1.30  0.49  0.35
World  Trading  (tonC/cap)  0.79  0.98  0.34  1.13  0.47  0.29
The  Kyoto commitment reduces per capita emissions in all  the  Kyoto-constrained  regions;
however,  the reduction  is less  severe,  the greater  the scope of trading. In full global trading,  as an
example,  per capita emissions  are reduced  by 14% on a global  scale, but by a greater percentage
in the non-Annex  B regions  since the share of the global emission  reduction  in the non-Annex  B
regions  is greater  than their share of emissions:  the aggregate  OECD+EET  reduction  is 9%, while
the FSU  reduction  is 13%  and the non-Annex  B reduction  is 18%.9
Within the Kyoto-constrained  regions, the reduction  in per capita emissions  varies considerably
depending  on the extent to which  the region  imports  permits.  At one extreme  is Japan, where per
capita emissions  would be less by only 2.7% because  it imports 92% of its emission reduction
obligation.  The greater percentage  reductions  in the other constrained  regions  reflect their lesser
dependence  on permit  imports:  EEC, -6.7%;  USA, -9.8%;  OOE, -12.6%;  and EET, -13.0%.  Finally,
as shown  in the figure, neither  the Kyoto  commitments  nor  the scope of trading  do much  to change
the ratio of emissions per capita between the industrialized  and developing economies of the
world.
3. IMPORT  LIMITATIONS  (Fig. 8, Tables  D to F)
The three illustrative  cases  presented  above  are based  on several  assumptions:
* Potential  participants  in emissions  trading  are not impeded  by restrictions  on trading,
* All parties participate  to the extent  warranted  by the economics,
, Trading  is conducted  efficiently  with low or non-existent  transactions  costs,  and
T  There  is no monopolistic  behavior.
Such assumptions  simplify exposition and the analysis of emissions  trading, but they are not
necessarily  realistic. One of the possible departures  from this theoretical  ideal is a limit on the
extent  to which an Annex B party can rely on emission  permits  to reduce  what otherwise  would  be
its  domestic abatement requirement.  The "supplementarity"  provisions of  the Kyoto Protocol
suggest such a limit, although  no specific number  has been agreed upon. More recently,  the EU
environmental  ministers  have  called  for a "concrete  ceiling"  on permit  imports.
To illustrate  the implications  of such a restriction,  we consider  limits  of 75%, 50% and 25% on any
Annex B party's  ability  to meet its emission  reduction  requirement  through  imported  permits. 8 From
the full global  trading  case without restrictions,  we know  that Japan would  optimally  realize  92% of
its Kyoto commitment  through imports, so that with a 75% limit, it would have to abate more
domestically.  The EEC would also be affected,  but to a very slight extent since it would  otherwise
import  76% of its emission  reduction  requirement;  but none  of the other importing  regions  would  be
affected.  With a 50% limit, all regions  would be limited and forced to abate more domestically  at
higher cost; and at a 25% limit, the reliance on higher  cost domestic abatement  would be even
greater.
[ia.j8  shows how the demand  curve is shifted  inward  by such limitations,  and Table 3 summarizes
the effects  on prices,  quantities  and costs.  The "No Limit' case is the same as full global trading,
and it is provided  for comparison.
8 The Kyoto Protocol spccifies only that "trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions." We define this potential
limitation as a percentage rclative to the emissiotn reduction implied by the Kyoto commitment without trading, given
EPPA's  prediction of reference emissions.10
TABLE 3:  Effects of Import Limits on Global Emissions Trading
No Limit  75% Limit  50% Limit  25% Limit
Market  Price  (85US$/tonC)  $24  $23  $13  $3
Quantity  Traded  (Mton  C)  935  913  656  328
FSU (Mton)  211  209  183  148
Non  Annex  B (Mton)  723  704  473  180
World  Cost  (Billion  US85$)  $11.2  $11.9  $21.7  $55.3
OECD+EET  Cost  $25.6  $25.4  $27.1  $56.1
FSU  Gain  $4.2  $4.0  $2.0  $0.5
Non  Annex  B Gain  $10.2  $9.5  $3.4  $0.3
The effect  of import limits  upon  the exporting  regions  is predictable.  With less demand,  the market
price falls, fewer "rights  to emit" are produced and exported,  and there is a drop in the gains to
exporters.  The effects on importers  are twofold. Importers  that are not affected by the limitation
import  more, and at a cheaper  price;  thus they realize  more savings.  They are better off because
the limitation  removes  some  of the demand  by higher  cost abaters  from the market.  Importers  who
are affected by the limitation  also benefit from this lower market price on their imports,  but they
also incur higher domestic  abatement  cost. 9 For instance, with the 75% limit, the net balance
between  these  two opposing  effects  is positive  for the EEC  (+1.14%  gains) but negative  for Japan
(-1.94%).
The overall  effect of the 75% limit is relatively  slight: the world cost increases  slightly (6.5%),  the
quantity  traded is 2% less,  the price falls by 4.1%, and the cost to the Kyoto-constrained  regions  is
reduced slightly. With a 50% or 25% limit on imported permits, all the importing regions are
restricted,  and the price of imports  is much lower, $13 and $3, respectively.  Among the importing
regions, the  effects of  this tighter limit depend upon the balance between higher domestic
abatement  costs  and cheaper  import  costs.  At 50%,  this balance  is now negative  for both EEC  and
Japan, but the benefit of the much cheaper imports continues  to outweigh the higher domestic
abatement  costs for the other three importing  regions.  With a 25% limit, all the importing  regions
are worse off than they  would  be without  any limit on imports,  and the percentage  increases  in cost
are greatest for the higher cost producers  of  abatement among the importing regions (JPN,
+425%; EEC,  +123%;  OOE,  +73%;  USA,  +58%;  EET, +5%).
From  the standpoint  of the suppliers,  the effect  of a limitation  on imports  is to skew  the distribution
of gains  from trading  even more heavily  in favor of the importing  regions.  It can be seen in Table 2
that, as the limit becomes  more stringent,  greater domestic abatement  by the importing  regions
causes  world cost.' to rise, but at least up to the 50% limit, the total cost for the importing  regions
remains  relatively  constant,  at $25-27 billion.  In contrast,  for the exporting  regions,  the gains  from
emissions  trading diminish markedly. The global efficiency losses due to  the import limit are
9  Consumers  will not receive  the  benefit of  cheaper  imports since  the discrepancy  between  the  internal marginal
abatement  cost and  the world  market price creates a rent for the  allowed imports that will be  collected somehow,
perhaps through a government auction of the rights to import permits. Since this sum is a  internal transfer, we do not
count it as a resource cost. We are indebted to Ken Chomitz  of the World Bank for pointing out this feature of our
analysis.11
effectively  shifted  to the exporting  regions  through  the lower price of imported  permits.  Only when
the limit becomes  very tight and the price of permits  is very low, for instance  within 25% limit, do
the increases in domestic abatement  costs outweigh the benefits of cheaper imports, and the
importing  regions  start to absorb  the efficiency  losses.
The effect of a quantitative  limit on imports  can be summarized  quickly. To the extent that it is
binding, it redistributes  the gains from trading among  the importing  regions  from those facing the
highest  abatement  costs  to those  facing the lowest  costs.  Furthermore,  and at least  initially,  it shifts
the increase  in global  cost caused  by a binding  import  limit  onto  the suppliers.
4. CDM "SURCHARGES"  AND CARTELIZATION  OF SUPPLY
Departures  from the theoretical ideal can also arise on the supply side. The Kyoto Protocol
provides  for a Clean Development  Mechanism  (CDM)  by which non-Annex  B emissions  reductions
would  be certified  and made available  as emission  permits  for Annex B countries.  The exact role of
the CDM has yet to be defined, but the Protocol does provide that the CDM would apply a
surcharge  to cover  its administrative  expense  and to collect  funds to assist countries  "to meet the
cost of adaptation"  (Article  12.8).  Also, because  of the inelasticity  of demand  at low market  prices,
there is a possibility  that suppliers could increase  their gains significantly  by colluding to limit
supply,  instead  of competing  among  themselves.
a) CDM Surcharaes  (Fia. 9. Tables G to 1)
CDM  surcharges  would  create  a wedge  between  the price paid by consumers  and that received  by
producers,  as illustrated  in Fiq. 9 for surcharges  of 25%, 50% and 100% of the marginal cost of
supply. Table 4 provides details concerning  prices,  quantities  and gains. Surcharges  of 50% or
100%  are beyond  any level being  discussed  currently,  but they do illustrate  the effects  of inelastic
demand.  Since FSU exports  would not be surcharged,  we treat the FSU as a competitive  supplier
in all these  cases.
TABLE 4. PRICES, FLOWS AND GAINS WITH A CDM SURCHARGE
LEVEL  OF CDM  SURCHARGE  None  25%  50%  100%
Market  Price  (85$)  $23.8  $27.4  $30.6  $35.9
Producers  Marginal  Cost (85$)  $23.8  $22.0  $20.4  $17.9
CDM Net profit  (billion  $)  $10.2  $12.6  $14.4  $17.0
Profit  to producers  $10.2  $8.9  $7.9  $6.3
Surcharge  Proceeds  $0  $3.7  $6.6  $10.7
CDM Exports  (MtonC)  723  687  654  602
FSU Exports  (MtonC)  211  219  225  235
FSU Gains  (billion  $)  $4.2  $5.0  $5.7  $6.9
OECD+EET  Cost  (billion  $)  $25.6  $28.9  $31.7  $36.3
World  Cost (billion  $)  $11.2  $15.0  $18.2  $23.012
The most notable  feature  of Table 4 is that CDM net profit, defined  as revenue  minus abatement
cost, increases  as the surcharge  is raised even though  importers reduce  demand  in response  to
the higher  prices.  This phenomenon  reflects  the price inelasticity  of demand  over  this portion  of the
aggregate demand curve. As would be true of any tax, there is a welfare loss, equal to the
increase  in world cost as a result  of the more  expensive  abatement  undertaken  by importers.
The second notable  feature of Table 4 is that producer  profit decreases  on the assumption  that
surcharge  revenue  goes to the CDM.  Of course, the distribution  of the proceeds  raised by the
surcharge  would be a matter for the producers  to decide. With inelastic demand, it would be
theoretically  possible  to devise  distributions  that would  keep producers  whole and still make  funds
available  for other purposes  such as adaptation.  Nevertheless,  any redistribution  of funds  for such
purposes  will reduce  what  the non-Annex  B producers  might  otherwise  receive.
The implicit  conflict  between  producer  interests  and re-distributive  goals has larger  implications  for
the evolution  of the global climate regime. It will be readily  evident  to all non-Annex  B producers
that the greatest  beneficiary  from CDM  surcharges  is the FSU.  As a competitive  supplier,  the FSU
benefits  directly from the increase  of the market price and the increase  of its exports. It is able to
benefit doubly because, having accepted an Annex B limit on emissions, its exports are not
surcharged.  The example  will be compelling  for many non-Annex  B producers,  who will come to
see Annex B accession  as a way  to by-pass  the CDM.  Proponents  of the CDM  will not be pleased,
but such action is essential  both to the creation of a more efficient global trading system and to
achieving  the stabilization  of atmospheric  concentrations  of GHGs.'°
Accession logically implies a transitional role for the CDM.  So long as the CDM provides  an
essential  service-recordation, certification  and verification-for converting  non-Annex  B emission
reductions  into tradable  emission  perrrits, a reasonable  fee can be charged. But that service,  and
the attendant  role for the CDM,  would no longer be needed  as non-Annex  B parties accept  limits
and arrange for their own certification  and verification as part of the global emissions  trading
regime.
b) Cartelization of Supply (Tables J to L)
The ability  to raise  surcharges  without diminishing  net profit to non-Annex  B producers  may inspire
thoughts of a cartel, not so much because of the CDM,  which might serve as a coordinating
mechanism,  but because  of the inelasticity  of demand that characterizes  the global emissions
market."' This potential is explored in Table 5. which compares the effects, under full global
trading, for a fully competitive  market and two alternative  assumptions  about non-competitive
behavior:
1)  A CDM  cartel  in which  the FSU is a competitive  supplier,  and
2)  A full supplier monopoly in which the FSU and the non-Annex B countries cooperate
through  the CDM  or an alternative  mechanism.
In calculating  the gains for the FSU and the non-Annex  B regions,  we assume  that the monopoly
rent, the difference  between  market price and marginal  cost, is shared in proportion  to the quantity
'°  See Yang  and Jacoby  (1997)  and Jacoby,  Prinn  and Schmalensee  (1998).
11 In contrast,  there is little  potential  for non-competitive  behavior  in the Annex  B case because  of the higher  price and
more  price elastic  demand,  as discussed  in Ellerman  and Decaux  (1998).13
of abatement  provided at marginal cost. In doing so, we also assume a highly efficient  cartel in
which only the lowest cost sources  of permits  are produced  (including  the FSU's  hot air).
TABLE  5. EFFECT  OF NON-COMPETITIVE  BEHAVIOR  ON
GAINS  FROM TRADE,  COSTS  AND  PRICES
Competitive  Non-Annex B  Non-Annex B
case  cartel  + FSU
monopoly
Market  Price  ($/metric  ton C)  $23.8  $62.7  $108.2
World Cost (billion 85US$)  $11.2  $20.0  $32.2
Non-Annex B Gains (billion $)  $10.2  $22.4  $30.1
FSU Gains (billion $)  $4.2  $13.8  $17.4
OECD+EET Gains (billion $)  $94.2  $63.6  $39.2
Successful monopolization  has the expected effects: the market price is higher, as is world
resource  cost, and the gains  from trade are shifted  substantially  to the suppliers.  In the case of the
0DM cartel  for example,  the importing  regions  lose $32 billion:  the $9 billion increase in global
costs plus a $23 billion transfer of income to tne suppliers.  With the full supply monopoly,  the
importing regions lose another $25 billion, $12 billion in increased resource cost and another $13
billion transfer to the suppliers.  Even though this is a dramatic change in the distribution  of the
gains from permit trade, the Kyoto-constrained  regions  are still better off (by $7 billion)  than if
there were no supply  at all from the non-Annex  B regions.  The FSU is, however,  always  worse off,
even  when the suppliers  successfully  create  an efficient  monopoly.
The incentive  to collude would be even greater if limits were placed simultaneously  on import
demands, since the effect of such limits is to make demand more inelastic.  Table 6 makes  the
point. It shows  the effect  of the full monopoly  on price, world cost and gains when there is no limit
on permit  imports  and when  a 50% limit  is set.
TABLE  6. EFFECT  OF MONOPOLY  ON
GAINS  FOR  SUPPLIERS  WHEN  LIMIT  ON PERMIT  IMPORTS
Limit  on  Competitive  case  Non-Annex  B +
imports  FSU monopoly
Market  Price  ($/metric  ton C)  No limit  $23.8  $108.2
50% limit  $12.5  $103.4
World  Cost  (Billion  85US$)  No limit  $11.2  $32.2
50% limit  $21.7  $37.6
Non-Annex  B Gains  (billion  $)  No limit  $10.2  $30.1
50% limit  $3.4  $26.2
FSU  Gains  (billion  $)  No limit  $4.2  $17.4
50% limit  $2.0  $16.3
OECD  + EET  Savings  (billion  $)  No limit  $94.2  $39.2
50% limit  $92.6  $39.814
The effect of successful  monopoly is much  the same whether or not there are import limits.  The
market  price rises to about the same level, $103  vs. $108, world  cost increases,  and the exporting
regions  gain significantly  Et the expense  of the importing  regions.  The effect  of a 50% import limit
is also much  the same  whether  a competitive  market  or a monopoly  is assumed.  The market price
is reduced,  world cost increases,  and producer  gains are diminished,  but by less  when there is a
monopoly.
5. INEFFICIENT  SUPPLY  (Figs. 10 and 11,  Tables  M to Y)
Full global trading is an appealing prospect,  to importers  for the great reductions  in cost and to
exporters  for the possibilities  of non-competitive  pricing, but both importers  and exporters  should
remember that the potential trading gains shown by CGE models assume complete economic
rationality  and negligible  transactions  cost. 12 The more  likely contour of global emissions  trading is
that this potential  will not spring  forth full blown  once trading is allowed,  but that it will develop only
slowly as experience is gained. Fig 10 depicts several possibilities  for less than fully efficient
supply  in which it is assumed  that 5%, 10%, 15%,  25%, and 50% of the supplies  from the FSU  and
non-Annex  B regions  are available  at every  price. 13 The lowest line, corresponding  to 100%,  is fully
efficient  global  trading.
Inefficient supply could result from several causes. The most serious and most likely is the
influence  of transaction  cost, particularly  that involved in meeting  the "additionality"  criterion. Past
experience  with credit-based  emissions  trading systems applied  to other environmental  problems
and with Joint Implementation  pilot projects has shown  these costs to be large and the quantities
traded to  be  small. 14 Alternatively, a  general failure  to  take  full  advantage of  economic
opportunities  presented  by emissions  trading would  also limit  the amount  of credits  available  from
the non-Annex B regions and the FSU. Finally, some non-Annex B countries have expressed
considerable  antipathy  to emissions  trading  as a concept;  and they may decide  not to participate  in
an emissions  trading regime,  whether  through  the CDM or otherwise,  for political reasons.  It is not
possible  to assess beforehand  to what extent  these causes might  operate in a global market, but
they will certainly  be present.
If the supplies  from the global market are very small initially,  say 5% of the full global potential,
then the market price for permits would be relatively  high ($181)  and the quantities  traded small
(170 Mton). As experience is gained and supplies become more ample, the quantities traded
would  increase  and prices  fall. The gains  from emissions  trading increase  with improved  efficiency
of supply and they become  quite large well before attaining  100% efficiency.  As shown in Fig 11,
12  EPPA 2.6 is not alone in making such forecasts.  The recent -i 1alysis provided by the U.S. Council of Economic
Advisors  to support  Chairman  Janet Yellen's earlier  testimony,  USG/EOB  (1998),  obtains  a similarly  low permit  price
for a comparable  market.
13 Expansion in the scope of trading would occur in periods after 2010, when permit demands and supplies might vary
depending on growth and subsequent climate agreements. This illustration, using a static 2010 picture, shows the nature
and approximate magnitude of the changes over time.
14 See UNCTAD (1998) for a discussion of the relative efficiency of allowance and credit based trading systems. These
costs will be greatly reduced to the extent  that non-Annex B regions  accept emission caps that remove the concern
about additionality and the necessity to establish a counterfactual baseline. Curiously, the Kyoto Protocol also asserts
"additionality" as a criterion for joint implementation projects within Annex B countries (cf. Art. 6).15
total gains increase  steadily,  but those  for exporters  increase  only up to a point a little abovel5%.
Thereafter,  the relatively  inelastic  demand  causes  the gains to exporters  to decline,  while  those to
the importers  increase  dramatically.
When supply is very inefficient, the market distortions considered earlier have little effect. For
example,  as severe a limitation  on demand  as a 25% ceiling would affect only Japan if supplies
from the FSU and non-Annex B regions were only 5% of the full potential. And at the prices
reflecting  very inefficient supply, there would be no gain to monopoly.  Nevertheless,  as supply
becomes  more  efficient  and prices decrease,  a limitation  on imports  would become  more binding;
and as the  market clearing price moved into the  inelastic range (below about $110), non-
competitive  pricing  could become  more  of a concern.
With inefficient  supply, the effect of CDM surcharges  will also depend  on the elasticity  of demand.
In the inelastic range (low price, large quantity),  corresponding  to greater supply from the non-
Annex B regions, the surcharge can result in greater gains for exporters,  so that it is at least
possible to  keep producers whole (compared to no surcharge) and generate funds for other
purposes.  However,  in the inelastic range (high price, small quantity),  any surcharge  will reduce
the total gain to be  shared  between  producers  and other  claimants.
As would be expected, inefficient  supply implies a higher market price, greater world cost and
fewer gains from trade, but the gains will still be substantial  and decidedly  worth pursuing.  The
effects  of distortions,  such as import limitations  and non-competitive  pricing,  are the same  as with
fully efficient  supply,  but the magnitude  of the effect  is less because  there is less  to lose. Perhaps
the most notable feature of inefficient supply is that the gains to early entrants in the global
emissions  market  will be very large. Thereafter,  as is true for any innovator,  the large initial reward
will dissipate  as imitators  follow.
6. INTERNATIONAL  TRADE IN ENERGY  AND NON-ENERGY  GOODS
MACs provide a simple and direct way to study emissions  trading, but they do not indicate  the
effect of abatement  actions on the prices and quantities  of goods in international  trade.  The effects
of emissions  reductions  may not be restricted  to the countries  undertaking  the abatement  actions.
Through  trade they may be transmitted  to countries  that made no commitment.  In this section,  we
depart  from the use  of MACs  and examine  these  other  effects  using  the EPPA  results  directly.
The central  feature  driving  these  trade-in-goods  effects  is the shadow  price for carbon  that is faced
by the Kyoto-constrained  regions,  and the effect  of that shadow  price on the world price for oil and
natural  gas. Table  7 provides  a quick summary  of those  prices for the 2010 reference  case  and our
three basic emissions  trading scenarios.  Carbon prices are shown in 1985 dollars; oil and gas
prices  are shown  as an index  with the 2010 price in the reference  case  set to 1.0.
TABLE  7. CARBON  AND ENERGY  PRICES  IN 2010  for Kyoto-constrained  regions
Reference  No Trading  Annex B  Global
Carbon  Price  $0  $116-584  $127  $24
Oil Price  1.0  0.90  0.95  0.99
Natural  Gas Price  1.0  0.83  0.86  0.9616
Oil and natural gas are treated as Hecksher-Ohlin  goods in EPPA, which means that there is
complete freedom of trade among regions and a single world price. As a result, restrictions  on
carbon emissions  in Annex B countries lead to lower oil and natural  gas prices for producers  and
consumers  throughout  the world. In contrast,  coal is an Armington  good,  which means  that there is
no single  world price but a series of regional  prices  that can be affected  by changes  in trade  flows.
Consequently,  actions by the Annex B regions  will affect  coal prices in these regions,  but generally
not elsewhere,  or only through  the quantities  traded  (which  are not great.)
As the scope of emissions  trading expands  and the price of carbon declines,  the effect of Kyoto
commitments  on energy prices diminishes.  This effect  occurs  because  one of the cheapest  forms
of carbon abatement  is the reduction of and substitution  away from the use of coal. Emissions
trading makes it  possible to  substitute reduced coal use in  non-Annex B  regions for  more
expensive  abatement  that reduces  oil and natural  gas use in Annex B regions.
The effects  on trade patterns  of the Kyoto commitments  and emissions  trading  are most usefully
observed  by comparing  the no trading case  with full global  trading. The former can be viewed  as a
relatively  inefficient  way of achieving  the goals set at Kyoto, while the latter represents  the most
efficient  way. Emissions  trade limited  to Annex B is an intermediate  case, which we omit because
its effects  lie between  what occurs  with  no emission  trading  and with full global  trading. 15
a) Trade in Goods with No Emissions Tradinq
The starting point for the no emissions  trading case is the effect of the carbon price on domestic
demand in the Kyoto-constrained  regions. Table 8  provides the percentage change from the
reference  prediction  for domestic use of sectoral  output (production  less exports  plus imports)  by
each Kyoto-constrained  region.  The sectoral  breakdown  in EPPA includes  five energy  sectors  (oil,
gas, coal, electricity  and refined oil) and three non-energy  sectors (agriculture,  energy intensive
industries,  and other  industries).
TABLE 8.  % CHANGE  IN DOMESTIC  USE  BY  SECTOR  AND REGION
DUE  TO KYOTO  COMMITMENT  WITHOUT  EMISSIONS  TRADING
l____  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET
OIL  -3.5%  -19.6%  -4.0%  -7.6%  -3.4%
GAS  -11.1%  -24.8%  -10.3%  -14.1%  -12.1%
COAL  -54.5%  -48.8%  -52.1%  -63.2%  -49.4%
ELEC  -11.1%  -11.3%  -12.2%  -13.1%  -19.7%
REFOIL  -6.5%  -20.3%  -7.7%  -10.6%  -7.7%
AGR  -0.7%  -2.2%  -0.2%  -0.9%  -0.4%
ENINTSV  -0.5%  -5.1%  -2.6%  -1.7%  -2.2%
OTHIND  +0.1%  -1.1%  -0.2%  -0.4%  -0.6%
With one insignificant  exception,  all the signs are negative,  and they are greatest  in magnitude  for
the energy sectors. Coal is hit hardest with domestic use declining  by about half in all regions.
15  The FSU is the one exception. With Annex B trading,  its demand  for energy declines in the same manner  as the
Kyoto-constrained  Annex  B regions,  as does its production  and export  of energy-intensive  goods.17
However,  coal, like electricity  and refined oil, is mostly a domestic  good so that the international
trade effect of this reduction in demand is not particularly  great. Oil and gas are more heavily
traded internationally,  and the effect  of the reduction  in Annex B demand  is a world-wide  fall in the
price of oil and gas: by 10% and 17%, respectively,  as was shown above in Table 6.16  This
reduction  in price reduces  the income  of oil and gas producers  throughout  the world; and the effect
will be particularly large on the  two oil  and gas exporting regions, the  EEX and the FSU.
Interestingly,  the quantities  of oil and gas traded internationally  do not change  much, but there is a
shift in the destination  of energy exports away from the Kyoto-constrained  regions  towards the
non-constrained  regions,  as illustrated  next, through  trade in energy-intensive  goods.
The domestic use of energy-intensive  goods declines in all Kyoto-constrained  regions; however,
the most significant  effects  show up in the trade balances  and domestic  output  for these  goods,  as
shown  in Table 9.
TABLE 9. CHANGES  IN EXPORT,  IMPORT  AND  OUTPUT
OF ENERGY  INTENSIVE  GOODS: NO EMISSIONS  TRADING
Absolute  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  FSU  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Change  in:  1  .
Net trade  -2.57  -30.96  -26.20  -6.29  -1.61  +7.93  +22.8  +6.78  +1.13  +6.07  +1.86  +21.1
Out  Ut  -6.90  -61.68  -42.25  -9.31  -499  +9.81  +21.1  +15.3  +2.74  +15.8  +3.46  L  +22.9
The patterns  are very clear. The Kyoto-constrained  regions reduce  production  and net exports  of
energy-intensive  goods, while the non-constrained  regions increase output and net exports of
them. The Kyoto-constrained  regions increase imports of these goods, and of the non-taxed
carbon  that is embodied  in them.
b) Comparing  the No-Trading  Case  with Full Global  Tradina
Meeting  the Kyoto  commitments  with full global trading has much less effect on Ani.ex B demand
for oil and gas and on the trade in energy-intensive  goods than was the case with no emissions
trading,  as shown  in Table 10 and Table 11.
16  The greater effect upon natural gas results from the  greater responsiveness to price changes  in the industrial and
residential  sectors,  where  natural gas  is mostly  used,  than  in  the  transportation sector,  where  petroleum  products
dominate. Both oil and natural gas gain share in electricity generation at the expense of coal, but electricity demand also
shrinks.  In the end, the balance between the losses in non-electricity sectors and the gains in electricity generation are
less favorable for natural gas than for oil.18
TABLE  10: % CHANGE  IN DOMESTIC  USE  BY SECTOR  AND  REGION
DUE  TO KYOTO  COMMITMENT  WITH FULL  GLOBAL  TRADING
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET
OIL  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -0.5%
GAS  -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.7%  -0.04%  -0.9%
COAL  -21.5%  -5.0%  -13.2%  -25.0%  -15.4%
ELEC  -2.5%  -0.3%  -1.6%  -2.3%  -5.0%
REFOIL  -1.0%  -0.8%  -0.6%  -1.2%  -1.5%
AGR  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.03%  -0.1%  +0.2%
ENINTSV  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  +0.02%
OTHIND  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%
The effects  of the Kyoto Protocol  remain  negative,  but the magnitudes  are much  attenuated.  Coal
use is reduced  by at most a quarter;  and the effect on other goods is generally  less than 1%. The
world prices for oil and natural  gas are reduced  by only 1.3% and 3.5%, respectively,  instead of
1  0% and 17%  in the no trading  case.
TABLE 11. CHANGES  IN EXPORT,  IMPORT  AND OUTPUT
OF ENERGY  INTENSIVE  GOODS: FULL  GLOBAL  TRADING
Absolute  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  FSU  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Change  in:
Net trade  +0.37  +0.30  -0.09  +0.  16  +0.  19  -. 71  +1.61  -2.60  -0.94  +0.53  -0.02  +1.22
Output  -0.59  -0.18  -0.93  -0.02  +0.21  L.81  +0.45  -8.90  -2.25  +0.10  -0.01  +1.24
The changes  in trade  and output of energy-intensive  goods are all relatively  small;  and there is no
consistent  pattern  as in Table 9, because  the price of carbon is the same in all countries.  Output
and the net trade position is most adversely affected in China, India and FSU because their
production  of energy intensive  goods is more dependent  on coal, which is the fuel most strongly
affected  by any positive  price on carbon  emissions.
c) Summary
The effects  of the Kyoto  Protocol  and of emissions  trading  on non-Annex  B regions  consist  of three
analytically  separate  elements,  which  can be summarized  by the following  simple  matrix.
TABLE  12: EFFECT  OF KYOTO  AND EMISSIONS  TRADING
KYOTO  EFFECT  No  Emissions  Global  Emissions
Trading  Trading
Permit  Revenues  0  +
Oil & Gas Export  Revenue
Energy  Intensive  Goo1s  Trade  +  019
Whether  there is emissions  trading or not, the effect of the Kyoto commitments  on non-Annex  B
countries  is mixed.  Without emissions  trading, there will be no permit exports, but an increase in
the production  and export of energy intensive  goods can be expected, assuming  no protective
trade measures  are enacted by the Kyoto-constrained  regions. With global emissions  trading,
there will be permit export revenues,  but no significant increase in production and exports of
energy intensive  goods. The revenues  of Non-Annex  B regions  that export oil and gas will be
adversely  affected  in either case, but much less so with the lower carbon price associated  with a
broadened  market for emissions permits. In effect, oil and gas exporters benefit as emissions
trading makes it possible for  Kyoto-constrained  regions to substitute reduced  coal use in non-
Annex  B regions  for reduced  oil and natural  gas use at home.
7. CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS
The effect on developing countries of Annex B actions to comply with the Kyoto Protocol will
depend on the  particular country and  on the success of  emissions trading. All developing
economies  will have an interest  in emissions  trading  as a source of new export  earnings,  but their
interest  will extend  beyond  this new commercial  possibility.  In particular,  oil  and gas exporters  will
have a strong interest in emissions  trading as a means to reduce the cost for Annex B parties
generally,  and specifically  to allow  Annex B parties  to substitute  reduced  coal emissions  abroad  for
reduced  oil and gas emissions  at home. It is possible  that some countries  and sectors would be
adversely  affected by emissions trading. For instance, the advantage enjoyed by producers  of
energy-intensive  goods will  be greater with  no emissions trading, assuming that  importing
embodied  carbon  is permitted  by the Annex B regions.  The net balance  will be different  for various
countries, but in general it seems likely that developing countries will benefit from emissions
trading.
The gains from emissions  trading are potentially  very large, fully sufficient  to give potential  buyers
and sellers  an economic  incentive  to support  such a system.  Most studies of permit  trade  suggest
ample supplies  would  be offered by non-Annex  B regions,  at commensurately  low prices, yielding
large cost reductions  for the Kyoto-constrained  regions and substantial  benefits to non-Annex  B
regions.  The actual supply is likely to be somewhat  less, at least initially,  due to transactions  cost
and  less than complete participation in the  market by  non-Annex B  regions. Nevertheless,
whatever the initial extent of the market and its subsequent development,  both importing and
exporting  parties  will gain.
As in any market, the potential for welfare-damaging  distortions is always present. Given the
undefined  meaning  of "supplemental"  in the Kyoto Protocol,  a particularly  alarming  distortion  from
the developing  country  standpoint  is a limitation  on Annex B imports  of emission  permits.  Not only
will such limits  depress  permit  prices and the export  earnings  of non-Annex  B parties,  but they will
have perverse effects on  importing countries. Annex B parties with relatively high domestic
abatement  costs, and thus higher imports, would be penalized,  while those with relatively low
domestic abatement costs, and fewer  imports, would find the  cost of  meeting their Kyoto
commitments  reduced.
The ability of the CDM to impose surcharges  to help countries  meet the costs of adaptation  will
depend upon the elasticity of demand,  which depends in turn on the supply available  from non-
Annex B regions.  The greater  the supply and the lower  the price,  the greater the ability to impose
surcharges  without fear of  losing revenue. Still, there is an unavoidable  conflict between the20
interests  of the producers  of the permits and redistributive  goals, since whatever  is redistributed
could  as well be kept by the producers.
The FSU and the non-Annex  B countries  appear  as clear rivals to each other  in the stylized  cases
we have presented,  but casting  this rivalry in geopolitical  terms obscures  a more practical  aspect.
Neither  the Annex B nor  the global market  will spring  into life full blown  as soon as the appropriate
institutional  arrangements  are made; instead these markets  will develop slowly over time. The
stylized  Annex B market should  be thought of as illustrating  the potential  gains for first entrants  of
whatever provenance  into a new and expanding  market.  Those gains will inevitably  be dissipated
as others  follow, so that the conflict,  which appears  here as one between  the FSU and non-Annex
B regions,  is really  one between  the early entrants  and later  followers.
The  FSU  does  however have  one  large  advantage. Assuming effective accounting and
enforcement, its  acceptance  of  an Annex B  emission limitation removes the high costs of
establishing additionality,  which will  be required of  projects in non-Annex B  countries. This
example  will encourage  the most enterprising  non-Annex  B countries to accede to Annex B to
capture more of the large gains of early emissions  trading. In doing so, these parties will foster
more efficient  emissions  trading  and promote  the ultimate  goals  of the Kyoto Protocol,  but they will
also necessarily  reduce  the ability  of the CDM  to act as a re-distributive  mechanism.
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Fig.  4: Aggregated  Supply  and Demand  Curves  - Kyoto -2010
Annex  B Trading  I World Trading
Kyoto  Cap
$200
S180-  ~  - Xndn
$160  - ___  __-
$140




S40  ______  Supply Work' i'g
...................  ....  .............................
\  S20  - . -e  -
0  200  400  600  800  1,000  1,200  1,400
Quantity  (Mton)
Fig. 5: Effect of Lower  and Higher  Growth Rates  (+/-10%)  on the
Kyoto Commitment  for JPN,  EEC,  USA





,500  LX, 
3500  ---- gs-  __---  ___-_______  \  7  - __________
o
4  400  .- USA
"'JPN
a  300-  200  300_400_500  _600  _700
Carbon  Emissions  Kyoto
_  a  Koto  low
0  20-  Kyoto high!
100
0-
0  100  200  300  400  500  600  700
Carbon Emissions  Reductions (Mton)23
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Figure  8: World Supply and Demand  - Kyoto  - 2010
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APPENDIX  A: MARGINAL  ABATEMENT  CURVES 17
a) What  are Marginal  Abatement  Curves  and What  Do They  Represent?  (Fig.  Al)
A CGE  model  will produce  a shadow
price for any constraint  on carbon
emissions  for a given region  R at time
T.  An  example would be  a  10%  Shadowpriceofcarbon  Re2tonR  timeT
reduction  below  the  reference  case  for  *
USA  in 2010. This price  indicates  the  m  Total cost  of abatement  /
marginal  cost  of reducing  the last  ton  I.  1  under constraint:  q abated
of  carbon  required  to  meet  the
constraint.  As might be expected  in a  P  . .MAC
proper CGE model, the shadow  prices
corresponding  to  constraints  of  plot  /
increasing  severity  rise  as  an
increasing  function  of  emissions
reduction. 
A  Marginal  Abatement  Curve  is
described by generating the plots of  .-  -'
the  shadow  prices  corresponding  to  q  C02 abated
constraints of  increasing severity at
time T, then drawing a line joining the
plots,  as in Fig.  Al.  Each  plot on the  Fig.  Al: Marginal  Abatement Curves
curve  for region R at time T represents
the marginal cost (p) of  abating an
additional unit of carbon emissions at quantity q. The integral under the curve (hatched area)
represents  the total abatement  cost associated  with each level of abatement,  that is, the resources
re-allocated  to abatement  because  of the constraint.
b)  How  can  MACs  be  Used  for  Trade  Studies?  (Fig.  A2)
If several regions commit to achieve emission reductions  at the same time and there is some
prediction  of what emissions  would be without the commitment,  the abatement  required can be
represented  as a point on each region's  marginal  abatement  curve. Moreover,  if the marginal  costs
associated  with those reductions  are different across regions,  the aggregate  cost of meeting  the
commitments  will be less  to the extent that a region  with higher  marginal  costs can induce  a region
with lower marginal costs to abate more on its behalf.' 8 By abating more, the lower cost region
produces  "rights to emit," or emission  permits, which it can sell to the higher cost region which
would thereby avoid a like amount of higher cost domestic abatement.  Thus, the difference  in the
17 This appendix draws heavily on Ellerman and Decaux, 1998.
18  As  is  typically assumed  in such  analyses,  and  as  is the  case  here, the  environmental  goal  pursued - reducing
atmospheric concentration of a long-lived, well-mixed greenhouse gas like CO 2 is not affected by the location of the
emission reduction.A2
marginal  costs associated  with each region's
commitment  in the absence  of trade creates  Shadow  price  of
a  potential gain  to  be  shared  in  some  carbon  Time  T
manner  between  them.  The  aggregate  j  R
emission  reduction  will be achieved at least  ................................................
cost when the two regions trade until their
marginal  abatement  costs are equal at what  A
will then be the market  clearing price for the  A
"right to emit" carbon.
Fig. A2 illustrates  the gains  from trading  for 2
regions  R 1 and R 2, subject  to the cunstraints:
C02 abated = q, for R 1 and q2 for R 2, and
Table  Al  below  displays  the  cost  0  01  Q  2
calculations in the no trading and trading
cases.  a . a.  a7  a',  co,
These  cost  calculations can  easily  be  Fig. A2: MACs Used  for Trade  Studies
generalized  to N regions,  and they constitute
the basis  for emissions  trading  studies  using MACs.
No Trade  Trade between RI and R 2
Constraints  Rl: q 1 abated  R 1 and R 2: q 1 + q2 abated
R2: g2 abated
Marginal  Cost  It  Market  Price  R,: pi  -R,  and R 2: p' such  that p',(q%,)  = P'2(q'2)  P
R2: P2  and q', + q'2= ql + q2
Abatement  Cost  R,: area AOQ,  R 1: area (A'OQ',)
R 2: area BOQ 2 R 2: area (B'OQ' 2)
Emission Permits  Trading  NA  R,: buys  right  to emit ql-q'I
R 2: sells right  to emit q' 2-q 2 = g1-q l
Imports  (+)/ Exports  (-)  NA  R,:pays p'  (ql-q',) = area (A'1 1Q1Q'l)to R 2
Flows  R 2:  receives  p' *  (q'2-q2) =  area  (B'12Q2Q'2) from  R,
Total Cost  Rl: area AOQ,  R,: area (A'OQ',) + area (A'l,Q,Q'l) < area (AOQ,)
R 2: area BOQ 2 A2: area (B'OQ' 2) - area (B'1 2Q2Q' 2) < area (BOQ 2)
Savings from Trading  NA  RI: area (AI,A')  (hatched)
R 2: area (B1 2B') (hatched)
Table Al:  Basics of Trade Studies
c) How  are MACs Generated  from  CGE Models?  (Fig.  A3, A4 and A5)
The  CGE  model we  use to  generate MACs is  the  MIT  Emissions Prediction and  Policy
Assessment  (EEPA)  model. It is a multi-sectoral,  multi-regional  global model of economic  activity,
energy use and greenhouse  gas (GHG) emissions  that is part of MIT's larger Integrated  GlobalA 3
Systems Model  (IGSM). 19  As such,  EPPA is frequently  used  to predict  emissions  and to assess  the
costs associated  with constraints  on carbon emissions.  Although EPPA predicts emissions  and
assesses  costs through  the year 2100, this study  takes the year 2010 as representative  of the first
commitment  period,  which includes  the years 2008 through  2012. The model keeps track of five
vintages of capital. Version 2.6 of the model incorporates  two backstop technologies;  however,
because  these energy sources  will not play a substantial  role in 2010, they are omitted  from the
calculations  presented  here.
To build the MACs, we run the EPPA model under  different  constraints  corresponding  to different
levels of carbon abatement,  such as 10%,  20%, or 30% of reference  emissions  in the year 2010.
For each set of constraints,  the corresponding,  regional  shadow  prices of carbon are an output of
the model  (in 1985 US$). 20 The shadow  prices for each region  can then be plotted  as a function  of
the level  of abatement,  and a line can  be fitted to the plots  to get the MAC  for that region  and time.
As an example, Fig. A3 shows the results obtained  for the four OECD regions  in 2010 when the
policies  applied are: proportional  reductions  by all OECD regions  (1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 and 40% of
reference  2010 emissions),  and no reduction  by other  regions.  Here,  the shadow  prices  have been
plotted as a function of the  percentage of carbon emission reduction (and not the absolute
quantities),  in order to normalize  for the size of the regions  and to show the variation in relative
cost across  regions.  For  any equal percentage  reduction  among  the OECD regions,  the abatement
of the corresponding  quantities  would cost most in Japan, then in EEC, and least in USA and
OOE.
Similar curves  can be obtained  for all regions.  For example,  the same proportional  reductions  can
be applied to all of EPPA's twelve regions at the same time. 21 Fia. A4 displays the marginal
abatement curves thus obtained. It shows where it is the cheapest to abate carbon emissions
(India and China)  and where  it is the most expensive  (Japan).
Stating marginal cost in terms of the proportional  reduction  reveals the relative cost of carbon
abatement among the twelve EPPA regions, but it does not indicate the importance  of various
regions  in an emissions  trading market. For example,  as shown in Fig. A4, both China and India
are relatively low cost suppliers of  abatement. However, as shown in Fiq. A5, China is a
significantly  greater potential  supplier of abatement  than India by the simple fact that its reference
emissions  are predicted  to be 3.5 times as large (1,792  vs. 486 Mton). 22 China  is about 70% more
carbon intensive  than India; and its economy  is predicted  to be about twice the size of India's in
2010. As a result,  for any given price, China  supplies  a much  larger quantity  of permits  than India.
China is by far the largest  potential  source of emissions  permits  from the non-Annex  B regions.For
instance,  if the market  price for emissions  permits  were $50, China  would  provide  about 700 Mton
of emissions  reduction,  while the five other regions  combined  would provide  only 400 Mton.
19  See  Yang et. al, 1996,  for a description  of EPPA,  and Prinn  et. al., 1998,  for a description  of the IGSM.
20  Although we often refer to CO 2 emissions,  all prices and quantities  are in terms of carbon. Each ton of carbon
corresponds  to 3.67 tons of carbon  dioxide.
21 In doing so, we  do not imply  that non-Annex  B countries  assume  quantitative  national  constraints,  but only  that when
faced with the corresponding  price for carbon emission  reductions,  they choose  to abate emissions  in the proportions
indicated.  The result  is similar,  but the motivation  is different.
22 We include  the USA in Fig A5 for comparison.A4
d) Assessing the "Robustness" of MACs with Regard to the Policy Apolied (Fig.  A6)
One question that arises immediately from our use of equal proportional reduction across regions
to  generate  the  MACs  is  whether  the  location  of  these  curves,  or  more  generally,  the  cost
associated with any given level of carbon abatement, is affected by differing levels of abatement in
other  regions.  For  instance,  as  can  be  seen  in  Table  1,  the  levels  of  implied  abatement
corresponding  to the Kyoto commitment are not strictly proportional, and with emissions trading,
we would not expect the percentage reductions among  regions to remain the same. Will  region
R,'s MAC look different depending on whether region R 2 reduces by 10% or 40%? In a model with
international trade in  all goods, such a., EPPA, there  is the possibility  that  a 40% reduction by
region R2 would alter trade flows such that abatement of, say, 100 Mton by R, would cost more (or
less)  than  if  R2 reduced  emissions  by  only  10%.  This  fundamental  question  is  that  of  the
robustness of the  MACs. And  indeed,  a drawing  like  Fig. 2  and  the  simple method  we  have
deduced from it assume this robustness (one curve for each region, whatever  the reductions in
other regions). The answer: they are robust.
For example, Fig. A6 shows simultaneously the two sets of MACs corresponding to varying levels
of OECD abatement  assuming no  emissions trading and fully  efficient  emissions trading. 23 The
curves in both sets are similar (less than 10% variation in price for any given level of abatement),
thus showing that the MACs are robust with regard to this change of policy. We have made similar
comparisons for Annex B trading  and global trading,  and we have examined one  region's MAC
(the USA) when all other regions vary from reference to as much as a 60% reduction. In all cases,
we have found the same fundamental result: whatever the trading scheme, whatever the extent of
the market, the marginal abatement curves are almost identical. These model results indicate that
abatement cost in a region is largely independent of abatement efforts in other regions.
Our  conclusion  is that  MACs, and  more generally,  the  costs  associated  with  a  given level  of
domestic abatement, are sufficiently insensitive to different levels of abatement among regions and
the scope of emissions trading to justify the analytic method applied here.
e) Analytical Approximations: a Simple Tool for Trade Studies (Fiq. A7)
Robustness implies that at time T each region has a unique marginal abatement curve. This result
allows  independent  use  of marginal abatement  curves,  once generated  from  CGE model, and
makes trade analysis straightforward. Such an analysis can be even further simplified if each curve
is described by  a single mathematical expression  because, once we  have the  equations of the
MACs, the cost calculations (i.e. integration under the curves) are simple and rapid.
Fig. A7 shows, for the OECD regions, that we can fit very simple analytical curves to the sets of
plots resulting from the EPPA runs, and that those fits are very good (for each curve, R 2 very close
to  1.0). This result holds for all the  other  regions  as well.  The curves  that  best fit  the  EPPA-
generated plots are of the form: P = aQ 2 + bQ, where Q is the amount  of carbon abatement in
Mton and P is the marginal cost, or shadow price, of carbon in 1985 US$. By integration, the total
cost of abatement is C = 1/3*aQ 3 +  1/2*bQ 2. The table below displays the coefficients a and b for
each region in 2010, as well as the coefficient of determination R 2.
23 Note that, compared  to figs. 3 and  4, the x-axis  has been  re-scaled  to quantities.A5
USA  0.0005  0.0398  0.9923  EEX  0.0032  0.3029  0.9983
JPN  0.0155  1.816  0.9938  CHN  0.00007  0.0239  0.9992
EEC  0.0024  0.1503  0.9951  IND  0.0015  0.0787  0.9970
OOE  0.0085  - 0.0986  0.9981  DAE  0.0047  0.3774  0.9996
EET  0.Otd9  0.0486  0.9973  BRA  0.5612  8.4974  0.9997
FSU  0.0023  0.0042  0.9938  ROW  0.0021  0.0805  0.9967
Table A2: Coefficients  of the Approximations  of the MACs of the Form: P = aO&  + bO
In using  these  aDproximations,  analysts  should  keep in mind that the price of this simplicity  is some
loss of the details of the general equilibrium  features  of the underlying  model. The robustness  of
the curves  assures  us that the relation  between  price and quantity  of abatement  is relatively  fixed,
but the curves  do not capture all the effects  of emissions  trading. Since  the EPPA model remains
our prirrary analysis  tool, we have run the model in every policy case we studied in order both  to
ensure that the approximations  are not misleading  and to capture any possible side effects. The
prices and quantities  for abatement  were all very close to the approximations,  but there is a side
effect that the MACs  do not show: "leakage." When carbon emissions  are constrained  for only a
sub-set of regions, carbon emissions tend to "leak" to non-constrained  regions. Nevertheless,
these effects  are not essential  to the analysis  conducted  here; 24 and the analytical  approximations
are a powerful  computational  shortcut  to particular  results.  They also provide  a convenient  way to
represent  graphically  the results  of the trading  analysis.
24  A more  extensive  discussion  of leakage,  and its relation  to hot air and emissions  trading,  is contained  in Ellerman  and
Decaux  (1998).A 6
f) Construction of Agaregate Supply  and Demand Curves fFigs.  A8. A9)
Marginal  abatement curves are  the
basis for determining  the demand and  PAL  I  Higher
supply  for  emission  permits  in  any  - - - market
given  market.  Emission  permits  pnce
represent "rights to  emit"  and  these  Atitarkic
rights can be produced by some party  miiarginal  …  - - - - - -_---
abating more than it is required to do,  price
or undertaking  some abatement when
not required  to do so. The willingness  of  Lower
any party to produce these permits is  - - ------  market
illustrated by  Fig.  A8.  The  vertical  _  price
dotted line represents the amount of  Kyoto  q
abatement  required  for a region  to meet
its Kyoto commitment.  In the absence  Fi.  A8: Wilingness  to  Import/Export
of any emissions  trading it would abate
the amount  indicated  by the intersection  with Regard to Market Price of Permits
of  'his  line with  the  MAC, and  the
corresponding  price would  be its autarkic  marginal  cost. If emissions  trading  were a possibility,  the
region  would purchase  or sell permits according  to the relation of the market  price to its autarkic
marginal  cost.
*  If the market price is lower than its autarkic marginal abatement  cost, this region would be
willing to buy emission  permits  corresponding  to the quantity difference  between  the autarkic
emission  reduction  and the domestic  abatement  it would  undertake  at the market  price.
*  Conversely,  if the market  price is higher  than its autarkic marginal  abatement  cost, it would be
willing to  undertake more abatement and supply the  market with the  'right to  emit' the
corresponding  quantity.
*  Unconstrained  regions,  such  as the non-Annex  B regions  or the FSU,  are a special  case.  Their
autarkic marginal  cost is zero, and they would  be only suppliers  to the market at any positive
price.
For whatever market one is considering,  we simply add up the quantities (x-axis) potentially
supplied  and those potentially  demanded  at each price (y-axis)  across the constituent  regions.  As
we vary the price, we describe the demand and the supply curves for this market, and their
intersection  indicates  the market  clearing price on the y-axis and the total quantity traded in that
market  on the x-axis.
Fig. A9 shows the aggregate demand and supply curves obtained in the Annex B and world
trading cases. The aggregate demand curve is the same in both the Annex B and the global
market because  both include all Kyoto-constrained,  i.e. potentially  importing,  regions.  This single
demand curve intersects  the horizontal axis at the quantity equal to the sum of the emission
reductions  required  to meet the Kyoto commitments,  which is 1.31 Gton. This is the "Kyoto cap"
represented  by a vartical dotted line on the figure; it is also the quantity of emission  permits  that
would be demanded  if the price were $0/ton.  At this price,  the aggregate  supply is the quantity  of
permits  available  at no cost.  This is the FSU's  111 Mton  of hot air.A 7
As the price increases,  the demand  for permits  diminishes,  as more  and more  domestic  abatement
is  undertaken, and the  supply of  permits increases as more abatement is justified in the
unconstrained,  exporting regions.  As long as the market price is less than the lowest autarkic
marginal cost for the Kyoto-constrained  regions,  these regions are always on the demand  side;
and the unconstrained  regions  are on the supply  side. When  the price reaches  $116, the marginal
cost for EET,  this region  switches  from the demand  side to the supply  side, resulting  in a "kink"  on
the demand  and supply curves (which happens to be almost indiscernible  because of the small
economic  size of this region).  Such  a kink can readily  be seen on both supply and demand  curves
when the price reaches  $186, the autarkic  marginal  cost for USA. There would  be similar  kinks at
$233 when OOE becomes a supplier and at $273 when the EEC does. At $584, the autarkic
marginal  cost for Japan meeting  the commitment,  the demand  for permits  would  be zero.
a) FiauresAB
Fig.  A3: EPPA-Generated  Marginal  Abatement  Curves -2010
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Fig.  A7: Marginal  Abatement  Curves  -2010
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APPENDIX  B:  DATA  TABLES
The following  tables  show the detailed results  for cases  studied  in the text. They  are the following:
Repeat of Tables Shown in the Text
Table 1: Reference Emissions and Kyoto Commitments  ......................................  B 3
Table 2: MACs Approximations Coefficients  ......................................  B 3
Basic  Cases - Reference  Scenario
Table A: Kv  oto No Trading  ......................................  B 3
Table B: Annex B Trading ......................................  B 3
Table C: World Trading  ......................................  B 3
Basic  Cases - Low  Growth  Scenario
Table A'.  Kyoto No Traditng  ......................................  B 3
Table B': Aznex B Trading ......................................  B 3
Table C': World Trading  ......................................  B 3
Basic  Cases - High  Growth  Scenario
Table A ":  Kvoto No Trading  ......................................  B 4
Table B": Annex B Trading  ......................................  B 4
Tlable  C": Woorld  Trading.......................................  B 4
Import Limitations
Table D: Imports Linmited  to 75% of Total Reduction  ......................................  B 4
Table E: Imports Limited to 50%,of Total Reductioni  ......................................  B 4
Table F: Imiiports  Limited to 25% of Total Reduction  ......................................  B 4
CDM Surcharges
Table G: 25% Surcharge  ......................................  B 5
Table H. 50% Surcharge ......................................  B 5
Table 1: 100% Surcharge  .....................................  B 5
Non-Competitive  Behavior
Table J: World Trading. CDM Monopoly .....................................  B 5
Table K: World Trading. CDM + FSU Monopoly  .....................................  B 5B 2
Table L: World  Trading,  CDM + FSU Monopoly,  with Imports  Limited  to 50% of Total  Reduction  ....................  B 5
Inefficient Supply: Limited to 50% of Full Potential Supply
Table  M: World  Trading,  Competitive  Case  .......................................................................  B 6
Table  N: World  Trading,  CDM  Monopoly  .......................................................................  B 6
Table  0: World  Trading,  CDM + FSU  Monopoly  .....................  ..........................  . .....................  B 6
Table  P: World  Trading,  Competitive  Case,  with  Imports  Lirrmited  to 50% of Total  Reduction  .............................  B 6
Table  Q: World  Trading,  CDM  Monopolh,  wvith  Imports  Limited  to 50% of Total  Reduction  .............  ..................  B 6
Table  R: WVorld  Trading,  CDM  + FSU  MonopolY,  w  ith Imports  Limited  to 50% of Total  Reduction  ....................  B 6
Table  S: World  Trading.,  Comnpetitive  Case,  wsith  Imports  Limited  to 25% of Total  Reduction  ..............................  B 6
Table  T. World  Trading,  CDM  Monopoly,  w fith  Itiports  Limited  to 25%  of Total  Reductiont  ................................  B 7
Table  U: World  Trading,  CDM  + FSU  Monopoly'  it  ith Imports  Litmited  to 25% of Total  Reduction  ...................  B 7
Other Inefficient  Suppy Cases: Limited to 25%. 15%o,  1O%,  5% of Full Potential SuppIV
Table V: World  Trading,  Competitive  Case,  Supplv Linmited  to 25% of Full Potential  ..........................................  B 7
Table IV:  World  Trading,  Competitive  Case,  Supplv  Limited  to 15%  of Full Potential  .........................................  B 7
Table  X: World  Trading,  Competitive  Case,  Supplh  Limited  to 10%  of Full Potential  ..........................................  B 7
Table Y.-  World  Trading,  Competitive  Case,  Supplv  Limited  to 5% of Full Potential  ..................  ..........................  B 7all the prices  in the followAng  tables  are in 1985$.  NAB  = Non-Annex  B regions  B 3
-LE 1  - bis: Reference emissions  and Kyoto  commitments
erence emissUSsA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EE  lac  tFSU  INAB 1WOrd jE  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
1990 (WIon)  1362  298  822  318  266  36  89  202  571  08  833  183  115  63  3201
201  0(Maon)  1838  424  1064  472  395149317631  4142  9098w  927  1792  486  308  97  532j
low  cenarlo  1748  412  1022  455  375  4012  737  3943  8695~  903  1687  457  293  96  510
hgh_scenazio  1923  _435  1102  488  416L..4A364  _  783  4327  94751 950  1891  514  323  98  551]
-to____  0.93  0.94  0.92  0.95  1.4\  j091__  __  \  \\  \\
'sslons in 2010 (Mton)  1267  280  757  301  277  28811  873  41421  7896  927  1792  486  308  97  532
low  scenanio  1267  280  757  301  2771  28811  873  39461  7700  903  1687  457  293  96  510
high  scenario  1267  280  757  301  2771  28811  873  4327w  8081  950  1891  514  323  98  551
iuctiorns  /ref  201lO(Mton)  572  144  307  171  118~  1312~  111  0  1202  0  0  0  0  0  0
low  scenrlao  481  132  266  154  98~  11321  136  01  995  0  0  0  0  0  0
high  scenario ___  657  155  346  187  1391 1484J  90  01393  0  0  0  0  0  0
BLE  2  - bis:  MACs approximatlons  coefficients  (P  = aR12.'-R)
[UAJP  EEC OOE  EE  [5  ~  ~  XN  ND  DAE  BRARW Is  OOE.04  I 55E.02  2.40E.03 8.50E.03  7 wOE 03130E  3  320E-03 7.00E505  1.50.03  4700.03 OS1EO0l  2 10E.031
________________0.0398  1.816 0.1503  -0.099 0.0496J  O.O2032  .29008  ~74&94000
.SIC CASES
BLE A: Kyoto no trading
[USA  JPN  -EEC  OOE-  EET  joecdi.eer(OS  i  WoF
ductions  /ref 201O(Mlon  572  144  307  171  1  1321  0
-- rginal  Costs  (S/ton)  $1  86  $54  S273  $233  $116 \  I  ~
.st of Abatement_($billion)  37.62  34.37 30.29 12.81-  4.67~ 119.761  0.00]
.BLE  B:  Annex  B trading  ___________________
_______  ______J_  [A  JPN  EEC  OOE  EST  ledetrUWorld
-ductions /ref 201  0 (Mton)  466  49  201  128  124  968  234  1202
ot  aie  (Mon)  \  \  \  \  \0  i111  ill
rtMawket Pico  ($/on)  $17  $2S17  S2  127  $127  $127  $127
'st  of  Abatement  ($bitlion) 21.16  2.82  9.51  5.16  5.36  44.01  9.95  53.96
.rmits  exp(-)Amp(+)  (Mton)  106  95  106  43  -6  345  -345  0
% of covnvtment (import)  19%  66%  35%  25% I  26%  I 
,Ws  eirp(-)Aimp(+)  ($billion)  13.44  12.06  13.51  5.49  -0.73  43.77  -43.77  0.00
'tat Coat  ($billion)  34.60  14.88  23.02  10.64  4.641  87.781 -33.82  53.96
.ins from trade  ($bilion)  3.03  19.49 7.27  2.7_.0  11.99  33.82  65.81
~BLE  C:  World  trading  _________________
TUSA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  Ioecdi.eetIFSU  INA  lWodtd  JEEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  RO~W
-ductions  /ref 201lO(Mton)  182  12  73  59  52  378  101  723[1202  51  437  102  42  2  89
:.-tts  Market  Pico  (S/to)  S24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24  $24
,st of Abatement  ($billion)  1.66  0.14  0.71  0.41  0.43  3.36~  0.81  6.99~ 11.15  0.54  4.22  0.95  0.44  0.03  0.81
:rmits  exp(-)/AmP(+)  (Mton)  390  132  234  112  66  93  -211  -723w  0  -51  -437  -102  -42  -2  -89
%  of  conxnitmwnt  Omport)  68%  92%  76%  66%  .56%  71% I  i  I  I  I  l  l 
owsex(-/irp()  $bilin)  9.27  3.15  5.57  2.67  1.57  22.241  -5.03  -17.21  0.00  -1.21  -10.40  -2.44  -0.99  -0.06  -2.12
stal  Cost ($billion)  10.94  3.29  6.29  3.09  2.011  25.601  -4.221  -10.221 .11.1$  -0.68  -6.17  -1.49  -0.55  -0.03  -1.31
ains from irade  ($billion)  26.69  31.08  24.00  9.73  2.66  924.16_ 4.221 10.22  10.61I  0.68  6.17  1.49  0.55_  0.03  1.31]
ASIC  CASES,  low  scenario  _____________________
'B8LE  A':  Kyoto  no trading  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
______________  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd.+eetIFSU  Wod
-ductions  /rat  201  0(Mton)  ]  481  132  266  154  98\  1132  0I  F12
arginal Cosft ($/ton)  $135  $51  0  S210  $187  S81I  I  I
ost of Abatement  ($billion)  j23.19  27.74  20.36  9.24  2.71  83.24  0.001  8.2
A.BLE  B':  Annex B trading  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
____  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  Loecd+eeIIFS  World
educlions  /ref 2010  (KMon)  385  37  164  109  103  799  196  995
lot  aie  (Mton)  \  \  \  \0  136  136
ormilts  Market  Pice  (S/ton)  $90  $90  $90  $90  $90  S90  $90  $90
ost of  Abatement  ($billion)  12.47  1.54  5.58  3.05  3.17  25.81  5.88  31.69
erTnits  exp(-)/1mp(+)  (Mton)  96  95  102  46  -5  333  -333  0
-% of cofvnitment (import)  20%  72%  38%  30%1  I  29% I 
tows  exp(-)/imp(+)  ($billion) 8.60  8.48  9.10  4.10 -0.48 29.79  -29.79  0.00
otat Cost (Sbiltion)  21.08  10.01  14.67  7.14  '2.69  55.591 -23.90  31.69
ains  from trade  ($billion)  2.11  17.73  5.69  2.10  0.02~  257.651  23.90  51.55
ABLE  C': World  trading  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
_____________  SA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  1o;;deilFSU  ~  WoIddEEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  RIOW
eduction/  ref 201  0(Wton)  152  9  60  52  44  316  86  593  995  41  358  85  33  2  74
lot aie  (Won)  \  \  \  \0  136  0  136  \  \  \  \  \
ermts Mwklet Pico($/ton)  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18  $181  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18
oat of Abatement  ($biltion)  1.04  0.08  0.44  0.26  0.27  2.09  0.51  4.30  6.90  0.32  2.60  0.59  0.26  0.02  0.51
effmits  exp(-)11nmp(+)  (Mton)  330  123  206  103  54  816  -223  -593  0  -41  -358  -85  -33  -2  -74
~7%  of o.mniftn3nt  (mpoItJ  686% 93%  78%  67%  55%  72%I  I1  I  I  I  I  i
lows  exp(-)/imp(+)  ($billion)  5.78  2.16  3.62  1.80  0.94  14.30 -3.91  -10.40 0.00 -0.71 -6.28 -1.49 -0.58 -0.03 -1.301
otal  Cost  ($bifilon)  6.82  2.24  4.08  2.06  1.22  16.391  -3.401  -6.10 6.90 -0.39 -3.68 -0.90 -0.32 -0.02 -0.79
-ains  from  trade  ($billion)  16.37  25.50 16.31  7.18  1.491  66.851  3.40L 6.101  76.351  0.39  3.68  0.90  0.32  0.02  0.791BSASIC  CASES,  hig  scenario  4
TABLE A":  Kyoto  no trading
_____________________  ~~USA  JPN  EEC  OCEz  EET  Jed.jFSUWol
Fleductionsl/ref  2010  (1ton)  1  657  155  346  187  1391  14841  0  [44
Marginal  Costs  (Sfton)  $242  $656  $339  $279  $159  I  \I
ICostOf  Abatement  ($1blWo1n)  55.77  41.28  42.00  16.83  7.531  163.41  0.00  134
TABLE  B':  Annex  B  trading  _____________
o -"  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd+eet  FSU  World
Reductorns/Iref  21OMtn)  540  61  235  146  143  1124  269  1393
-Hot  aie(Mton)  \  %  0  90  90
Permits  Market  Pico  ($on)  $167  $167  $167  S187  $167  $167  $167  S167
Cost  of Abatement  ($Ibillion)  32.09  4.51  14.48  7.81  8.12  67.00  15.06  82.06
Perrrats  exp(-)Amnp(+)  (Miton)  116  95  ill  41  -4  359  -359  0
i.  e%  of  comynitrntr  (import)  18%  61%  32%  22% I  24% I
Flws exp{-)1p(+) ($bililon)  19.49  15.84  18.57  6.64  -0.61  60.14  -60.14  0.00
Total Cost ($billion)  51.58  20.35  33.05  14.65  7.51  127.14  -45.08  82.06
[Gains fromn  trade  ($billion)  4.19  20.93  8.95  2.18  0.01  36.27  45.08  81.36
TABLE  C": World  trading  _______________
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd.+eer  FSU  NAB  lWorld  EEX  CHN  IND  OAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  /ref  201  0(Mton)  210  15  85  66  59  435  114  844  1393  61  510  118  50  3  103
'Hot  air  (Mlon1)  \  \  \  0  90  0  90  \  \  \  \  \  \
Permfts  Market  Pico  ($fton)  S30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30  $30
Cost  of  Abatement  ($billion)  2.42  0,22  1.05  0.60  0.63  4.90  1.16 10.26 16.33  0.80  6.19  1.38  0.66  0.04  1.18
Pe-'its  exp(-yimp(+)(Mton)  447  141  260  121  80  1049  -204  -844  0  -61  -510  -118  -50  -3  -103
i.  a%  of commritment  (import)  68%  90%  75%  65%  5%  71% l  I  I  II  I  I  I
Flows  exp(-)Atmp(+)  ($billion)  13.57  4.27  7.90  3.68  2.431  31.84 -6.20  -25.64 0.00 -1.85  -15.47  -3.60 -1.51 -0.09 -3.11
Total  Cost  ($billion)  15.98  4.48  8.95  4.28  3.05L36.74  -5.041  -15.37  116.33  -1.05 -9.28 -2.21 -0.85 -0.05 -1.94
IGains  from trade  ($billion)  139.79  36.80 33.05 12.56  4.48 126.6]7  5.04 153  47.09  1.05  9.28  2.21  0.85  0.05  1.94
[IMPORT  LIMITATIONS
TABLE  D:  75%  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  o~erdee  FSU  NAB  World EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductiorts  Iref 201lO(Mton)  178  36  77  58  5  1  399  99  704  1202  49  425  100  40  2  87
'Hot  aje (Mton)  \  \  \  \  \0  i111  0  ill\  \  \  \  \  '
Permits Market Pico ($jton)  $23  $23  $23  $23  $23  $23  $23  $23  S23  $23  $23  $23  $23  $23  $23
Cost  of  Abatement  ($billion)  1.56  1.42  0.81  0.39  0.41  4.58  0.76  6.54 11.88  0.50  3.96  0.89  0.41  0.03  0.76
Permnits  exp(-)fimp(+)  (Witon)  394  108  230  113  67  913  -209  -704  0  -49  -425  -100  -40  -2  -87
ie9%  of  commnifmenf  (import)t 69%  75%  75%  66%  57%  68%  I  1  I  I
Flows  exp(-)i`mp(+)  ($billion)  8.99  2.47  5.26  2.59  1.54  20.84  -4.77  -16.071  0.0  -1.13 .9.70 -2.28 -0.92 -0.05 -1.98
Total  Cost  ($bllion)  10.55  3.89  6.06  2.97  1.94  25.42 -4.02 -9.52 11.88 -0.63 -5.75 -1.39 -0.51 -0.03  -1.22
iGairns  from  trade  ($billton)  127.07  30.48 24.22  9.84  2.73  94.34  4.02  9.52  107.88  0.63  5.75  1.39  0.51  0.03  1.22
ideftsganinIn%  /noimit  (tabiel  1%  -2%  1%  1%  2%  0%1-5%1-7-/l-1%  -7%-/  7¶.-7%  -7%/-8%  .7%
TABLE  E: 50%  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
___________________  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd*eet  F-SU  NAB  World  EEX  CHN  IND  OAE  BRA  ROW
ReductmIonsref  201  0(Mton)  286  72  154  86  59  656  73  473  1202  31  286  69  25  1  60
'Hot  aie  (Mton)  \  I  \  \  0  i1l1  0  ill1\  \  \  I  I
PermIts Market Pico ($/ton)  S13  $13  S13  $13  S13  $13  $13  $13  $13  $13  $13  $13  $13  $13  $13
Cost  of Abatement  ($billion)  5.52  6.66  4.67  1.42  0.63  18.89  0.31  2.50  21.70  0.18  1.52  0.35  0.15  0.01  0.30
Permiits  exp(-)Amp(+)  (Mton)  286  72  154  86  59  656  -183  -473  0  -31  -286  -69  -25  -1  -60
i.  a% of conyvrititent  (import)  50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  49% I  I  I  1  I  I  I
Flows  exp(-)i`mp(-.)  ($billioni)  3.58  0.90  1.93  1.07  0.74  8.23  -2.30  -5.93  0.00  -0.39  -3.58  -0.86  -0.32  -0.02  -0.76
Total  Cost  ($billion)  9.10  7.56  6.60  2.50  1.37  27.12 -1.99 -3.42  21.70 -0.21 -2.06 -0.51 -0.17 -0.01 -0.46
IGains  from  trade  ($billion)  128.53  26.81  23.69  10.32  3.30  92.64  1.99  3.42  98.06  0.21  2.06  0.51  0.17  0.01  0.46
Idelta gain in % I no limit (table  J  7%/ -14%  -1%  6%/  24/  2%  -3'.46  9%  -67%  465%/  469%  -71%  465%/
TABLE  F: 25%  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
__________________  ~USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd.eet  FSU  NAB  World EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions/Iref  2010  (Mton)  429  108  230  129  89  984  38  180  1202  10  108  28  8  0  25
'Hot  aie (Mton)  I  0  il11  0  ill\  I  I  I 
Permts Markcet  Pico  ($lon)  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3  $3
Cost of Abatement  ($billion)  16.79  17.15  13.77  5.20  2.02  54.94  0.04  0.28  55.26  0.02  0.17  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.04
Permrits  exp(-)/irnp{+)  (Mton)  143  36  77  43  30  328  -148  -180  0  -10  -108  -28  -8  0  -25
19  a%  of  conmritment(imiport)? 25%  25%  25%  25%  25%  24%I 1  I  I  I  I  I  I  I
Flow exp(-)Aimp(+)  ($bittior)  0.48  0.12  0.26  0.15  0.10  1.11  -0.50 -0.611  0.00  -0.03  -0.37 -0.10 -0.03  0.00 -0.09
Total  Cost  ($billion)  17.27 17.28 14.04  5.35  2.12  56.051  -0.46 -0.33  55.26 -0.02 -0.20 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.05
Gains  from trade ($bitllon)  I20.35  17.09  16.25  7.47  2.55  63.721  0.46  0.331  64.511  0.02  0.20  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.05
idelta gain In % I no  limit (table  1-24%  -45%  -32%/  -23%  -4%-2  -89%.-971/6  -41% -- 97%.  -97%  -967.  -97%/  -98%  -96%B5
*M  SUCHARGES__________________________
BLE G 25%
_____  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  Io9Weed.OIFSU INAB  LWorld IEEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  RO 
ductions  /rat 201  0 (MIon)  198  1  4  80  63  58  410  108  6871  1205  48  415  98  39  2  85
ol aie (Mton)  \  \  0  il1l  Cj  1\ll\  \ 
tnnt  Mawket  Ples (MAon)  S27  S27  $27  S27  S27  S27  S27  S22  S22  $22  $22  $22  $22  $22
st of Abatwemevt  ($bIlflon)  2.07  0.18  0.89  0.51  0.54  4.19  1.00  6.15w 11.34  0.47  3.72  0.84  0.38  0.02  0.72
mTds  exp(-)Amp(+)  (Mtlon)  374  131  227  108  62  902  -219  -6871  -3  -48  -415  -98  -39  .2  .85
-ws exp(-)Amp(..)  ($billion)  10.26  3.58  6.23  2.98  1.70  24.75  -6.01  -15.07  3.68  -1.05  -9.10  -2.14  -0.86  -0.05  .1.86
tal Cost  ($15lllon)  12.32  3.76  7.13  3.49  2.241  28.941  .5.011  -8.92  156.021 -0.59  -5.38  -1.30  -0.48  -0.03  -1.15
zins from  trade  ($bi8ion)  25.30  30.60  23.16  9.33  2.43  90.821  5.011  8.921  104.75  0.59  5.38  1.30  0.48  0.03  1.15
ttagainin%/nollmit(table]  -5S%  -2%  -3%1  -4%  .9%[  .4%1 19%J.1  43-%I  1.4  .14%  -13%  *12%  -14%  -14%  -12%
~BLE  H: 50%
__________  TUSA__JPN  -- EEC  -OOE  EET  jeod  ~tiFSU  INAB  Iworid  IEEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
-ductions  /re201lO(Mton)  211  1  5  88  66  59  436  114  6541 1205  45  395  93  37  2  81
:otaWe(Mton)  \  '  '  \0  i111  01  ill  ~  ~ 
z.,ftA Market Pico  (Mfon)  $31  $31  $31  $31  $31  $31  $31  $20  $20  $20  S20  $20  $20  $20
-st of AbatemerTt  ($billion)  2.44  0.22  1.06  0.60  0.63  4.95  1.17  5.461 11.58  0.41  3.30  0.75  0.34  0.02  0.64
-mift exp(-)fimp(+)  (Liton)  361  129  221  105  59  876  -225  -6541  -3  -45  -395  -93  -37  -2  -81
owsexp(-)Amp(+)  ($billion)  11.03  3.95  6.76  3.22  1.80  26.76  -6.87  -13.32  6.57  -0.93  -8.05 -1.90 -0.75 -0.04 -1.65
4tal  Cost  ($billion)  13.47  4.17  7.82  3.82  2.431  31.71  -5.70  -7.86  18.151 -0.51  -4.74  -1.15  -0.42  -0.02  -1.011
Ains-from  tmde  ($billion)  24.16  30.20  22.46  9.00  2.241  88.061  5.701 7.8610161  0.51  4.74  1.15  0.42  _0.02 _1.01]
'Ita gain In % / no limit (italej  -9%*  -3%  :-%  -8%  -- 16%[/F-  461/6  '1  35t.2-3%J/  ---6%j  -24%  -23%  -23%  -24%  -26%  -22%1
%BLE  1:  1001%
SA  JN  EEC  OOE  EErT  oe  Ceet  ND  BAE  BRA  ROWCH
cduclions  /ref 2010(Mton)  231  1  7  95  71  64  479  124  602  12041  41  364  86  34  2  75
Iot  aWe(AMon)  \  \  \  \0  ill1  01  i1ll
:--mits  Market Pico.(SAon)  $36  $36  $36  $36  $36  $36  $36 j$189  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18  $18
ost ofAbatement  ($bifllon)  3.12  0.30  1.36  0.77  0.80  6.34  1.49j  4.461 12.30j  0.33  2.70  0.61  0.27  0.02  0.53
armits exp(-)ffmp(+) (Mon)  341  127  212  100  54  834  -2351-6021-21  -41  -364  -86  -34  -2  -75
-%of  conmmitent  Omport)  60%  88%  69%  59%  45%  62% I  [I{  I  I  II
ows  exp(-)fimp(-i) ($billion)  12.22  4.56  7.62  3.60  1.93 29.92 -8.41  -10.79  10.71 -0.74 -6.52 -1.55  -0.60 -0.03 -1.35
otla Cost ($bilfion)  15.34  4.85  8.98  4.37  2.731  36.261  -6.92  -6.33  23.011  -0.41  -3.82  -0.93  -0.33  -0.02  -082
amns  from  trade ($billion)  22.29  29.52  21.31  8.45  1.941  83.50169  6.331 96.6  0.41  3.82  0.93..  0.33  0.02  0.821
:lta gakinln%/Ino limkt(ab  -16%  -5%  -11%  -13%---27%_  1  .11%.  64%  -3%  1%  40%  -38%  -37V.6  .40%  42%  .7%
ON-COMPETn  E B H  V O  ~-  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
ABLE J: World  trading,  CDU  monopoly__________________
JUSA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EETr _IedelFSU  INAB  jWorld  JEEX  CHN  IND__  DAE  BRA  ROW  I
educfions  /ret 2O1lO-(Mton)  317  28  133  92  86  656  164  382  1202  24  230  56  20  1  50
lot aie (Mlon)  \  \  \0  i111  0  ill  \  \ 
ewmlts  Market Pico ($/ton)  $63  $63  $63  $63  $63  $63  $63  $63  S63  $63  $63  $63  $63  $63  $63
ost ofAbatemnent  ($billion)  7.29  0.82  3.24  1.78  1.~86  14.99  3.45  1.52  19.96  0.10  0.92  0.22  0.08  0.00  0.19
ermnits  exp(-)Amp(+)  (Mton)  255  116  174  79  32  656  -275  -382  0  -24  -230  -56  -20  -1  -50
ae%of  comrVnitment(rimpoit)  45%  81%  57%  46%  27%1  50%I  I  I  I  I  I
lows exp(-)Amp(-i)  ($billion)  15.99  7.30  10.91  4.99  2.00  41.19  -17.24  -23.94  0.00  -1.52  -14.46  -3.54  -1.23  -0.06  -3.13
otal Cost  ($billion)  23.28  8.12  14.14  6.77  3.86  56.1  7-1  3.79  -22.43i  19.96  -1.42  -13.54  -3.33  -1.15  -0.06  -2.94
-ains from trade ($billion)  114.34  26.25  16.15  6.05  0.801  63.591 13.791 22.43  99.811  1.42  13.54  3.33  1.15  0.06  2.94
ABLE  K: World  trading,  CDM+FSU  monopoly  _____________________
[USA  JN  EEC  OE  EET  loecd+eetIF-S-U  [N-AB[TW-orld TEEX CHN  IND  DAE  BR  RO
ieductions /ref  201  0 (MIon)  -417  42  179  116  112  8661  51 -285  1202  1  7  172  43  1  4  1  38
Hot  aWe(Mton)  \  \  \  \  \0  ill1  0  ill1\  \  \ 
-enmlts  Market Pico(S/ion)  $108  $1  08  $108  $108  $108  $108  $108  $1  08  S108  $1  08  $108  $108  $108  $1  08  $108
;ost of Abatement  ($billion)  15.58  1.99  6.99  3.80  3.96  32.311 0.11  0.77  33.20  0.05  0.47  0.11  0.04  0.00  0.10
earmits  exp(-)/imp(+)  (Mton)  154  102  128  55  7  446!  -161  -285  0  -17  -172  -43  -14  -1  -38
a %oftcommYmfrrent(imnpofl)  27%  71%  42%  32%  6%  34%jI  I  I  I  I  I  I
iows exp(.)/lmp(+)  ($billion)  16.69  11.06  13.89  5.95  0.70  48.291  -17.47  -30.82 0.00 -1.86  -18.58  -4.66 -1.51 -0.08 -4.15
otla Cost  ($biIlioni)  32.28  13.05  20.87  9.75  4.66  861-7.6-30.051 33.20  -. 1-18.11  -4.54  -1.47 -0.07 -4.05
;ains  from  trade  ($biliBon)  5.35  21.32  9.41  3.06  0.1  39.16j17.361  30.051 86.71  1.81  18.11  4.54  1.47  0.07  4.05
ABLE L: 50%/  - CDM+FSU  monopoly
__  U__  IS-A  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  Io9cd+eet4FSU _[NAB  lWorld TEEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
ieductions  /ref  261  O(Mton)  417  72  179  116  Ill  895  46  259  1202  15  156  39  12  1  35
Hot  aWe(Won)  \  "  \  \  \0  111  0  ill1\  \ 
-errnlts Market Pico  (SAon)  $103  $103  $103  $103  $1  03  $103  $103  $103  $103  $103  $103  $103  $103  $103  $103
-ost of Abatement  ($biIIiGn)  15.52  6.66  6.96  3.78  3.94  36.85  0.09  0.63  37.56  0.04  0.38  0.09  0.03  0.00  0.08
'ermits exp(-)rimp(+)  (Mlton)  155  72  129  55  7  417  -158  -259  0  -15  -156  -39  -12  -1  -35
%  of  commitment  1imporl)  27%  50%  42%  32%  6%  31%I  I  I  I  I  I  1I
lows exp(-)Amp(+)  ($billion)  16.02  7.46  13.30  5.70  0.69  43.16  -16.36  -26.80  0.00  -1.60  -16.14  -4.08  -1.29  -0.06  -3.64
otal Cost ($billiont)  31.53  14.11  20.25  9.49  4.631  80.01  -16.27  -26.171 37.561  -1.56  -15.76  -3.98  -1.26  -0.06  -3.561
;ains  from trade($billion)  6.09  20.26  10.03  3.33  0.04  3751.726.171  82.201  1.56  15.76  3.98  1.26  0.06  3.56
e9tta  gain In % /no  limit (tabWl  -77%/  -35%  -58%  -66%  -98%J .58%1  285%1 156%I -24¶'1  129%  155%  168%  128%  106%  173%18 6
JINEFFICIENT  SUPPLY  -560%
TABLE  M: competitive  ca"e  __________  ____________
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oedet  FSU  NAB  World JEEX  CHN  ]NO  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductoios/Iref  201  0 (Mton)  286  24  120  84  78  593  75  590  1257  45  355  81  36  2  70
Hl-ot  aWe(Mon)  '.  \  \\0  55  0  55  \  \  \  \
PermitsMarket  Pices($ton)  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  $52  S52  $52  S52
Cost  of  Abatement($8illion)  5.53  0.59  2.45  1.36  1.42  11.34  1.32  11.98  24.63  0.98  7.20  1.59  0.80  0.06  1.35
Permits  exp(-)Ap(e) (Micn)  285  120  188  87  40  720  -130  -590  0  -45  -355  -81  -36  -2  .70
iLe  %  ofTn  *mnw  # nwort)  50%  83%  61%  51%  34%  55%l 1I  1  1
Flows  exp(.Yimpt+)  ISbflUo)  14.94  6.29  9.82  4.55  208  37.6  -. 82-3.8  0.00  -2.33 -18.59  -4.25  -1.90  -0.12  -3.66
Total  Cost  ($b!Ulon)  20.47  6.88  12.26  5.90  3.49  49.01 -5.50  -888  24.,63  -1.35 -1  1.39  -2.68  -1.10  -0.07  -2.31
Gainslromtrada($billion)  17.15  27.48  18.03  6.91  1.18  70.75  5.50  18.88  95.131  1.35  11.39  2.66  1.10  0.07  2.31
deitgalln%noimittabIe  _36%/  -12%/  -25%  -29  -%  25  30%1  85%  .112%1 99%  85%  79%  100%  121%  77%
TABLE  N: CDM monopoly  ___________________  __________
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oiad+eet FSU  NAB  Wodld EEX  CH-N  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reducfions  Iret2010(Mton)  385  37  164  109  103  799  98  360  1257  25  217  ~51  21  1  44
Hot  aie (Mion)  \  . \N  0  55  0  55  \  \  \  \
Permit  Market Pico  (MAon)  $90  $90  $90  $90  $90  $90  $90  $90  590  590  590  590  590  $90  S90
Cost of Abatement($tbilion)  12.48  1.54  5.58  3.05  3.17  25.83  2.94  3.45  32.22  0.26  2.09  0.47  0.22  0.01  0.40
Pemelts  exp(-)Amp(+)  (Mion)  186  107  143  83  1  5  513  -153  -380  0  -25  -217  -51  -21  -1  -44
i.  a% of co7lftmre nt  port)  33%  74%  48%  37%  12%  39%  I  I  1  i  I 
FRows  exp(-)Aimp(-s)  ($billioni)  16.68  9.56  12.79  5.62  1.311  45.9  -1.4-2.3  00  I-2.27  -19.46  -4.57  -1.85  -0.11  -3.97
Total  Cost  ($billion)  29.17  11.10  18.37  8.67  4.48  71.79  -10.80 -28.77  32.22  -2.01  -17.38  -4.10  -1.83  -0.09  -3.57
Gsinsfrmtrada(bii)  8.46  23.27  11.91  4.15  0.19  47.97  10.80  28.77  87.54  2+01  17.38  4.10  1.63  0.09  3.57
deltaglnln%/oil  :l(table  -88%  -25%  -50%  -67%/-93%1  -416  156%1 181%1 -19'!.  196% 182%!  175%  1197%  212%  173%
TABLE  0:  CDM+FSU monopoly  ________________
__________________  ~USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd+aee  FSU  NAB  World  tEEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  /ret 201lO(Mlon)  434  4  5  187  121  116  902  45  310  1257  2 1  187  44  1  7  1  39
'Hotaae (Aon)  \  \\0  55  0  55 \  \  \  \  \
Permlts  MarcePice(SMon)  $112  $112  $112  $112  $112  $112  $112  S112  $112 $1  12  $112  5112  $112  $112  $112
Cost  of  Abetemenl($billion)  17.43 2.26  7.82  4.25  4.42 36.18 0.28  2.40 38.87 0.18  1.45 0.33  0.15  0.01  0.28
Perrmits  exp(-)fimp(+)  (Mon)  137  100  121  51  2  410  -100  -310  0  -21  -187  -44  -17  - 1  -39
i.eg%  of  commnitent  rlmport)  24%  69%  39%  30%  2%  31%I  1  I  i  I 
R1ows exp(-A/mp(+)  ($bil8on)  15.31  11.13  13.46  5.67  0.24  45.82  -11.17  -346  0.00  -2.39  -20.94  -4.96  -1.94  -0.11  -4.32
Total  Coo ($billion)  32.74  13.39  21.29  9.92  4.87  82.00  -1.9-32.25  38.87  -2.21  -19.48  -4.63  -1.79  -0.10  -4.04
.ansro  ,ade($AIlo)  .8  20.98  9.00  2.89  0.DO  37.76  1.932.25  80.901  2.21  19.48  4.63  1.79  0.10  4.04
dla  nl%Inli=  (tabi  -82%/  -33%  -62%1  -70%  -100%  -60%18/  25%  -26/.  225% 2116%/  211%  226%  234%  209%.
TABLE  P:  competitive  case  -with  50%  limItation  on  imports  ________________
____________________  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd+%ee  FSU  NAB  World  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductlons  /rel  201O(Mlon)  286  72  154  86  7  1  688  68  522  1257  3  9  315  72  32  2  62
'Hot  aie(Mton)  \  \  0  55  0  55  \  \  \  \  \  \
PennlbMarket  Pice(MAoa)  $43  S43  $43  S4.3  $43  $43  $43  $43  $43  $43  S43  $43  S43  $43  $43
Cost  ofAbalemtnl($billion)  5.52  6.66  4.67  1.42  1.05  19.31  0.97  8.75  29.03  0.70  5.27  1.17  0.58  0,04  0.99
Permitexp(-)Amp(-i)  (Mon)  286  72  154  86  47  645  -123  -522  0  -39  -315  -72  -32  -2  -62
. %  of  commnitment  (onport)  50%  50%  50%  50%  40%  49%\  I  I  I
Flows  exp>(-)Almp(+)  ($billion)  12.22 3.08  6.57  3.66  2.03 27.56 -5.26  -22.30  0.00 -1.66  -13.45  -3.09  -1.35  -0.09  -2.67
TotalCost  ($billion)  17.73 9.74 11.24 5.08  3.08 46.87 -4.29  -13.55  29.03 -0.95  -8.18  -1.92  -0.78  -0.05  -1.67
Ganlotae$Illo)  1.89  24.63  19.05 7.73  1.59 72.89  4.29 13.55  90.73  0.95  8.18  1.92  0.78 0.05  1.67
delagani%1n=li(tabij  1295%  -21% -21% -21%  -40%  -23%  1  %  33%  -16%  41%  33%  29%  41%  51%  28%
TABLE  0:  CDM monopoly  - with  50%  limitation  on  imports
USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd.-et  FSU  NAB  World  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  /ref  201  0  (Mon)  379  72  161  107  102  821  97  339  1257  24  205  48  19  1  42
'Hot  aier(Won)  I  0  55  0  55  \  \  \  \  \  \
Permits  Market  Pico  ($hon)  S87  $87  $87  $87  587  $87  $87  587  $87  587  $87  S87  $87  S87  587
Cost  ofAbatemnent  (fbillion) 11.91 6.66  5.32  2.91  3.03 29.82  2.81  2.99  35.63  0.23  1.81  0.41  0.19  0.01  0.35
PerNmts  exp>(-)mp(+)  (Mieon)  193  72  146  64  1  6  491  -152  -339  0  -24  -205  -48  -19  -1  -42
i.  e % ofconvnIment  CrmporV)  34%  50%  47%  38%  14%  37% I  I  I  I  I  I1
Flows  exp(-)/imp(-t)  ($billion)  16.74 6.26 12.65 5.59  1.41 42.65  -13.19  -29  .46  .0  -. 06 -178  -4.19  -1.68  -0.10  -3.64
Total  Cost  ($b1illion)  28.65  12.91  17.98 8.49  4.44 72.47  -110.38  -26.471  35.631  -1.83  -15.99  -3.78  -1.49  -0.08  -3.30
Gainsfromtrade  ($bill,ion)  t,,8.98  21.45 12.31 4.32  0.231  472  I0382.784.14  1.83  15.99  3.78  1.49 0.08  3.30
detaaii%In.llmt(t  e  -66%  -31%  -49%/  -56%.-91%  -50%  146%  __159%  _.230/1  170%  159%  154%  170%  182%  152%
TABLE R: CDM+FSU  monopoly  - with 50%  limitation on Imports
____________________  USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd+eet  FSU  NAB  World  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  Ire  2010  (Mton)  432  72  186  120  115  926  42  289  1257  20  175  42  1  6  1  36
,Hot  aje(Mon)  1  0  55  0  551  \ 
Permlts  Markcet  Pico  (Son)  $111  $111  $111  $111  $111  $111 $111  $111  $111  $111 $111  $111  $111  Sill  Sill
Cost  ofAbatemient  ($billion) 17.20 6.66  7.72  4.19  4.36 40.14 0.24  2.02  42.40 0.15  1.23 0.28  0.12  0.01  0.24
Peimls  exp>(-)imp(+)  (Mien)  139  72  121  51  3  387  -98  -289  0  -20  -175  -42  -16  - 1  -36
i.a% of  cornmnitmrent  tipo4l)  24%  50%  40%  30%  2%  2.9% 1  I  I  I  I  I  I
Rlows  exp(-)Amp(+)  ($billion)  15.40 7.98 13.45 5.68  0.30 42.81  -10.81  -32.00 0.00 -2.18  -19.34  -4.60  -1.77  -0.10 -4.02
Total  Cost  ($billion)  32.61  14.64  21.17  9.88  4.66 82.95  -10.57  -29.98  42.40 -2.03  -18.11  -4.32  -1.65  -0.09 -3.78
Gainslron,trade($bullion)  5.02 19.73 9.12 2.94  0.01 36.81  10.571  29.98  77.36 2.03 18.11 4.32  1.65 0.09  3.78
del=gani%/nillt(tabie  -81%  -37I.  -62%  -70% -100%  -61%  150%1 193%1 -29%  199%  193%  190%  199%  203%  19
TABLE 5: competitve case -with 25%  limitation on imports
__________________  ~USA  JPN  EEC  00E  EET  oeodi-eet  FSU_  NAB  iWorld  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  /ref 2010(Mion)  429  108  230  129  89  984  36  236  1257  1  6  143  34  1  3  1  30
Hot  aie  (Mton)  I  \  10  55  0  551  \ 
Permits  Mawkt  Picoe(Son)  $13  $13  $13  $13  S13  $13  $13  $13  $13  $13  S13  $13  $13  $13  $13
Cost  of  Abatement  ($bili)  16.79  17.15  13.77  5.20  2.02  54.94 0.15  1.25  56.34 0.09  0.76  0.18  0.07  0.00  0.15
Permits  e,gp-)Amp{-s)  (Mica)  143  36  77  43  30  328  -92  -236  0  -16  -143  -34  -13  -1  -30
L.e  %  of cofriwnnent  (import)  25%  25%  25%  25%  25%  25% 1  I  I  I  I  I  I
Flows  exp(-)Amnp(+)  ($biltcon)  1.79  0.45  0.96  0.54  0.37  4.11  -1.15  -2.96  0.00  -0.20  -1.79  -0.43  -0.16  -0.01  -0.38
Total  Cost  ($bllilon)  18.58  17.61  14.74 5.74  2.39 59.05 -1.00  -1.71I56.34  -0.11  -1.03  -0.26  -0.09 0.00 -0.23
Galsfrmtrde(11i1ca  19  I.05  16.76  15.55 7.07  2.281  60.711  1.00  11.71  63.421  Oil  1.03  0.26  0.09  0.00  0.23
dela  ai in%/n.  ilimtit)(table  -2'9%  -46%  -35%  -27%  -14%1  -36%/  -76,.  -83%1  .42%  -14%  -83%-83%  -84%  -8$%  -3%TABLE  T: CDM  monopoly  - with  25% limItation  on imports  B  7
___________________  ~~USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oede  FSU  NA  lWri  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  /ref 201  0 (Mton)  429  108  230  129  114  1010  108  139  1257  8  84  21  7  0  19
'Hot  aie(Mton)  \  \0  55  0  55  \  \  \  \  \
Pernits  Market  Pico  (Aon)  Slo9  $109  $1  09  $109  $109  $109  Sl09Si$109  $1  09  $1  09  slogS$109  $1  09  $109  $109
Cost  of  Abatwment($bllion)  16.79  17.15 ~3.77  5.20  4.26  57.18  3.95  0.36 61.49  0.02  0.22  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.05
PerrnIse9xp(-)/knp(+)  (Mton)  143  36  77  43  4  302  -164  -139  0  -8  -84  -21  -7  0  -19
iLe  %of  corrnitment (import)  25%  25%  25%  25%  3%  23%II  I  III
Flows  exp(-)/imp(,) ($bllionI)  15.57  3.93  8.37  4.67  0.40  32.931 -117.83  -115.10  0.001  -0.91  -9.10  -2.29  -0.73  -0.04  -2.04
Total Cost ($billion)  32.36  21.08  22.14  9.87  4.66  90.11  -13.88  -14.74  61.491  -0.89  -8.88  -2.23  -0.72  -0.04  -1.99
Gansfrmlad(Sitlon)  5.27  13.29  8.14  2.94  0.01  29.66  13.88  14.74  58.271  0.89  8.88  2.23  0.72  0.04  1.99
Idete  gainlIn %/nollmlt(tablsl  -80%  -57%/  466%  -70%-/-100%  469%1 229%1  44%  _-46%1  31%  44%  50%  30%  18%  52%/6
TABLE U: CDM+FSU  monopoly  - with  25% lImitation on Imports
___________________  ~~~USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EST  oad  etFSU  NAB  World  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  /ref  2010  (Mton)  447  108  230  129  119  1034  31  192  1257  12  116  28  10  1I  25
'Hot  aWe(Mton)  \  ~\0  55  0  55  \  \  \  \
Permits  Market  Pico(Aoti)  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118  $118
Cost  of  Abatement  ($billion)  18.92  17.15 13.77  5.20  4.80  59.85  0.10  0.77 60.72  0.05  0.47  0.11  0.04  0.00  0.09
PerNits  exp(-)/irp(+)  (Mtoni)  124  36  77  43  - 1  279  -87  -192  0  -12  -116  -28  -10  -1  -25
L.e  %of commitment  rimport)  22%  25%  25%  25% I  21%  I  I  I  II  I 
Rtows  exp(-)/lmp(+)  (fbilion)  14.64  4.25  9.06  5.05 -0.13  28  -10.221  -22.6  .0  -. 4-36  33  11  00  29
Total  Cost  ($billion)  33.55 21.41 22.83 10.26  4.67  92.711  -110.122121.8600.711  -1.  39 -13.21  -3.24 -1.12 -0.06 -2.86
IGains  trotae  ifion)  4.07  12.96  7.46  2.56  0.00  27.05  10.12  21.88  59.05  1:39  13.21  3.24  1.12  0.06  2.86
ideltagainIn % /no limit(table  -85%  -58%  469%  -74%  -100%  -71%1  140%1 114%1 -46%1  105%  114%  118%/ 104%  94%  119%
JOTHER  INEFFICIENT  SUPPLIES:  251%,  15%,  10%.o  5%,  competitive  cases_________________
TABLE  V: 25%  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
___________________  ~~USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd+eel  FSU  NAB  Woi  EEX  Cl-N  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
FReductlons  /ref 201lO(Mton)  395  39  169  ill  106  819  50  415  1285  33  250  56  27  2  4
'Hot  ale(Mton)  \  \  \  \  \0  28  0  28  \  \  \  \  \
Permits  Market  Pice (Mon)  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94  $94
Cost  ofAbatemnent  ($billion)  13.37  1.67  5.98  3.26  3.40  27.68  1.58  14.67  43.92  1.23  8.79  1.92  1.01  0.08  1.63
Permitsexp(-)Amp(+)  (Mton)  177  105  138  60  1  2  493  -78  -415  0  -33  -250  -56  -27  -2  -48
i.ea  % of conwrnitmert  (import)  31%  73%  45%  35%  10%  38% I  I  I  I  I  I
Rows exp(-)/imp(+)  ($billion)  16.55  9.88  12.97  5.66  1.14  46.21 -7.30  -38.9  0.0  -. 5  -23.40  -5.27 -2.50 -0.17  4  52
Total  Cost  ($billion)  2.215418.96  8.93  4.4  7.8  57  -4.24 43.2  31.82  -14.60  -3.35  -1.49 -0.10  2.89
IGains  from  trade  ($billion)  7.;70  22.82 11.33  3.89  0.13  45.88  5.72 24.24 75.84  1.~82  14.60  3.35  1.49  0.10  2.89
idetsagainIn % /no limit (table  -1  -27  -53%  460%  -95%  -51%1 35%1 137%1 -30%1  168%  137%  125%  170%  220%  121%
TABLE  W: 15%  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
USA  JPN  EEC  COE  EET  oecd+eet  FSU  NAB  World  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Rleductions/  reft201  O(Won)  465  49  200  128  123  965  35  296  1296  24  178  40  19  1  34-
Hot  aie(won)  \  \  \0  1  7  0  17  \  \  \  \
PwrmltaMarket  Plce  ($/ton)  $126  $126  S126  $126  $126  $126  $1  26  $126  $126  $126  $126  $1  26  $126  $1  26  $126
Cost  ofAbatement  ($billion)  21.00  2.79  9.44  5.12  5.32  43.68  0.54  6.04 50.26  0.56  3.60  0.75  0.46  0.04  0.63
Perits  exp(-)Almp(+)  (Mlon)  107  95  107  44  -5  347  -52  -296  0  -24  -178  -40  -19  -1  -34
L.e  %ofconnitmewnt (import)  19%  66%  35' . 25%  -5%  26%I  I1  I  I  I
Rtows  exp(-)Amp(+)  ($billion)  13.53 12.02 13.51 5.50  -0.68 43.88 -6.52  -37.36 0.00 -2.98  -22.44  -5.03 -2.44 -0.18 -4.30
Total  Cost (ftillon)  34.53 14.82 22.96 10.62  4.64  87.56 -5.98  -31.32  50.26 -2.42  -18.84  -4.27 -1.98 -0.13 -3.67
iGaIns  fromtrmde  ($biffion)  13.09  19.55  7.33_ 2.20  0.03  32.20  5.98 31.32 69.51  2.42 18.84  4.27  1.98  0.13  3.67
IdetsagainIn % Ino llmit(tble  -88%  -37%/  469%  -77%  -99%/  466%1  42%1206  -36%1 256%  205%  187%/  259%  347%  181%
TABLE  X: 10%/
___________________  ~~~USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd4eet  FSU  NAB  World  EEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductlons  /ret  201lO(Mton)  509  56  221  139  135  1059  25  217  1301  17  130  29  14  1  25
'Hot  aie  (NMon)  \  \  \  \  \0  11  0  11\  \  \  \  \  \
Permits  Market  Pico($Aon)  $150  S150  $150  S150  $150  $1  50  $150  $150  $150  $150  $150  $1  50  5150  5150  $150
Cost  of  Abatement  ($billion) 27.16  3.74 12.24  6.61  6.88  56.62  0.21  2.76 59.59  0.27  1.64  0.33  0.23  0.02  0.27
Permnits  exp(-)Amp(+)  (Mton)  62  88  87  33  -17  253  -36  -217  0  -17  -130  -29  -14  -1  -25
i.e %of coffvrrtmernt  (import)  11%  61%  28%  19%  -14%  19% I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Flows  exp(-)/irnp(+)  ($billion) 9.36 13.24 12.99  4.90 -2.50 37.98 -5.471  -32.52 0.00 -2.61  -19.52  -4.36 -2.14 -0.16 -3.73
Total  Cost  ($billion)  36.51  16.97  25.23  11.51  4.38  94.60  -5.26  -29.75  59.59 -2.34  -17.88  -4.03 -1.91 -0.13 -3.46
IGainstfrom  trade  ($billion)  1.11 17.40  5.06  1.30  0.29  25.16  5.26 29.75 60.18  2.34 17.88  4.03  1.91  0.13  3.46
Idelta gain  in%/  no limit (table[  -96%  -44%  _-79/.-87%/.-89  -73-/  25% 19%  45  244%  190%  171%  248%  348%  165%
TABLE Y: 5%
___________________  ~~~USA  JPN  EEC  OOE  EET  oecd+eeljFSU  NAB  World  tEEX  CHN  IND  DAE  BRA  ROW
Reductions  /ref 201  0(Mton)  563  64  245  152  148  1172  14  120  1307  10  72  16  8  1  14
Hot  aje  (mton)  \  \  \  \0  6  0  6\  \  \  I  I
Permlts  Market  Picoe(ton)  $181  $181  $181  $181  $181  $181  $181  $181  $181  $1  81  $181  $1  81  $181  $181  $181
Cost  of Abatement  ($billion)  38.05  5.13  16.28  8.77  9.12.  75.35  0.04  0.67 76.05  0.07  0.39  0.07  0.06  0.01  0.06
Permits  exp(-)Almp(+)  (Mton)  9  80  62  20  -30  140  -20  -120  0  -10  -72  -16  -8  - 1  -14
i.e% of commitment  (import)  2%  55%  20%  11%  -26%  11% I  IIIII
Rlows  exp(-)fimnp(+)  ($billion)  1.55  14.45 11.25  3.54 -5.47 25.33 -3.53  -21.80 0.00 -1.76  -13.08  -2.91 -1.45 -0.11 -2.49
Total  Cost  ($billion)  37.60  19.58  27.53  12.32  3.65  100.68  -3.49  -21.13  76.05  -1.69  -12.69  -2.84  -1.39  -0.10  -2.43
iGainstfrom  tmde  ($billion)  0.02  14.79  2.76  0.50  1.02  19.09  3.49  21.13  43.71  1.69  12.69  2.84  1.39  0.10  2.431
Idetta  gain ln%/no  llmit(tablel -100%  -52%  -89%.  -95%  462%  -8%  -7  0  -60%1 149%/  106%  91%  152%  236%/  86%/Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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